Article
AI
Culture
10 min read

We’ll learn to live with AI: here’s how

AI might just help us with life’s dilemmas, if we are responsible.

Andrew is Emeritus Professor of Nanomaterials at the University of Oxford. 

Two construction workers stand and talk with a humanoid AI colleague.
Nick Jones/Midjourney.ai

Anxiety about algorithms is nothing new.  Back in 2020, It was a bad summer for the public image of algorithms. ‘I am afraid your grades were almost derailed by a mutant algorithm’, the then Prime Minister told pupils at a school. No topic in higher education is more sensitive than who gets a place at which university, and the thought that unfair decisions might be based on an errant algorithm caused understandable consternation. That algorithms have been used for many decades with widespread acceptance for coping with examination issues ranging from individual ill health to study of the wrong set text by a whole school seems quietly to have slipped under the radar.  

Algorithmic decision-making is not new. Go back thousands of years to Hebrew Deuteronomic law: if a man had sex with a woman who was engaged to be married to another man, then this was unconditionally a capital offence for the man. But for the woman it depended on the circumstances. If it occurred in a city, then she would be regarded as culpable, on the grounds that she should have screamed for help. But if it occurred in the open country, then she was presumed innocent, since however loudly she might have cried out there would have been no one to hear her. This is a kind of algorithmic justice: IF in city THEN woman guilty ELSE woman not guilty.  

Artificial intelligence is undergoing a transition from classification to decision-making. Broad artificial intelligence, or artificial general intelligence (AGI), in which the machines set their own goals, is the subject of gripping movies and philosophical analysis. Experts disagree about whether or when AGI will be achieved. Narrow artificial intelligence (AI) is with us now, in the form of machine learning. Where previously computers were programmed to perform a task, now they are programmed to learn to perform a task.  

We use machine learning in my laboratory in Oxford. We undertake research on solid state devices for quantum technologies such as quantum computing. We cool a device to 1/50 of a degree above absolute zero, which is colder than anywhere in the universe that we know of outside a laboratory, and put one electron into each region, which may be only 1/1000 the diameter of a hair on your head. We then have to tune up the very delicate quantum states. Even for an experienced researcher this can take several hours. Our ‘machine’ has learned how to tune our quantum devices in less than 10 minutes.  

Students in the laboratory are now very reluctant to tune devices by hand. It is as if all your life you have been washing your shirts in the bathtub with a bar of soap. It may be tedious, but it is the only way to get your shirts clean, and you do it as cheerfully as you can … until one day you acquire a washing machine, so that all you have to do is put in the shirts and some detergent, shut the door and press the switch. You come back two hours later, and your shirts are clean. You never want to go back to washing them in the bathtub with a bar of soap. And no one wants to go back to doing experiments without the machine. In my laboratory the machine decides what the next measurement will be.  

Suppose that a machine came to know my preferences better than I can articulate them myself. The best professionals can already do this in their areas of expertise, and good friends sometimes seem to know us better than we know ourselves. 

Many tasks previously reserved for humans are now done by machine learning. Passport control at international airports uses machine learning for passport recognition. An experienced immigration officer who examines one passport per minute might have seen four million faces by the end of their career. The machines were trained on fifty million faces before they were put into service. No wonder they do well.  

Extraordinary benefits are being seen in health care. There is now a growing number of diagnostic studies in which the machines outperform humans, for example, in screening ultrasound scans or radiographs. Which would you rather be diagnosed by? An established human radiologist, or a machine with demonstrated superior performance? To put it another way, would you want to be diagnosed by a machine that knew less than your doctor? Answer: ‘No!’ Well then, would you want to be diagnosed by a doctor who knew less than the machine? That’s more difficult. Perhaps the question needs to be changed. Would you prefer to be treated by a doctor without machine learning or by a doctor making wise use of machine learning?  

If we want humans to be involved in decisions involving our health, how much more in decisions involving our liberty. But are humans completely reliable and consistent? A peer-reviewed study suggested that the probability of a favourable parole decision depended on whether the judges had had their lunch. The very fact that appeals are sometimes successful provides empirical evidence that law, like any other human endeavour, involves uncertainty and fallibility. When it became apparent that in the UK there was inconsistency in sentencing for similar offences, in what the press called a postcode lottery, the Sentencing Council for England and Wales was established to promote greater transparency and consistency in sentencing. The code sets out factors which judges must consider in passing sentence, and ranges of tariffs for different kinds of crimes. If you like, it is another step in algorithmic sentencing. Would you want a machine that is less consistent than a judge to pass sentence? See the sequence of questions above about a doctor.  

We may consider that judicial sentencing has a special case for human involvement because it involves restricting an individual’s freedom. What about democracy? How should citizens decide how to vote when given the opportunity?  Voter A may prioritise public services, and she may seek to identify the party (if the choices are between well identified parties) which will best promote education, health, law and order, and other services which she values. She may also have a concern for the poor and favour redistributive taxation. Voter B may have different priorities and seek simply to vote for the party which in his judgement will leave him best off. Other factors may come into play, such as the perceived trustworthiness of an individual candidate, or their ability to evoke empathy from fellow citizens.  

This kind of dilemma is something machines can help with, because they are good at multi-objective optimisation. A semiconductor industry might want chips that are as small as possible, and as fast as possible, and consume as little power as possible, and are as reliable as possible, and as cheap to manufacture as possible, but these requirements are in tension with one another. Techniques are becoming available to enable machines to make optimal decisions in such situations, and they may be better at them than humans. Suppose that a machine came to know my preferences better than I can articulate them myself. The best professionals can already do this in their areas of expertise, and good friends sometimes seem to know us better than we know ourselves. Suppose also that the machine was better than me at analysing which candidate if elected would be more likely to deliver the optimal combination of my preferences. Might there be something to be said for benefitting from that guidance?  

If we get it right, the technologies of the machine learning age will provide new opportunities for Homo fidelis to promote human flourishing at its best.

By this point you may be sucking air through your intellectual teeth. You may be increasingly alarmed about machines taking decisions that should be reserved for humans. What are the sources of such unease? One may be that, at least in deep neural networks, the decisions that machines make may be only as good as the data on which they have been trained. If a machine has learned from data in which black people have an above average rate of recidivism, then black people may be disadvantaged in parole decisions taken by the machine. But this is not an area in which humans are perfect; that is why we have hidden bias training. In the era of Black Lives Matter we scarcely need reminding that humans are not immune to prejudice.  

Another source of unease may be the use to which machine learning is put for commercial and political ends. If you think that machine learning is not already being applied to you, you are probably mistaken. Almost every time you do an online search or use social media, the big data companies are harvesting your data exhaust for their own ends. Even if your phone calls and emails are secure, they still generate metadata. European legislation is better than most, and the Online Safety Act 2023 will make the use of Internet services safer for individuals in the United Kingdom. But there is a limit to what regulation can protect, and 2024 is likely to see machine learning powerfully deployed to sway voters in elections in half the world. Targeted persuasion predates AI, as Othello’s Iago knew, but machine learning has brought it to an unprecedented level of industrialisation, with some of the best minds in the world paid some of the highest salaries in the world to maximise the user’s screen time and the personalisation of commercial and political influence.  

Need it be so? In some ways advances in machine learning are acting as the canary in the mine, alerting us to fundamental questions about what humans are for, and what it means to be human. The old model of Homo economicus—rational, selfish, greedy, lazy man—has passed its sell-by date. It is being replaced by what I like to call Homo fidelis—ethical, caring, generous, energetic woman and man. For as long as AGI remains science fiction, it is up to humans to determine what values the machines are to implement. If we get it right, the technologies of the machine learning age will provide new opportunities for Homo fidelis to promote human flourishing at its best.  

Whatever the future capabilities of machines, they cannot be morally load-bearing because humans are self-aware and mortal, whereas machines are not.

Paul Collier and John Kay

Christians have been thinking about what it means to be human for two millennia, building on what came before, and so they ought to have something to contribute to how humans flourish. In It Keeps Me Seeking, my co-authors and I ask our readers to imagine that they were writing about three thousand years ago for people who knew nothing of modern genetics or psychological science about what it means to be human. ‘You are writing for a storytelling culture, and so you would probably put it in the form of a story. Let’s say you set it in a garden. The garden is pleasant, but it is also designed for character formation, and so there is work to do, and also the possibility for a hard moral choice. You want to convey that humans need social interactions (for the same reason that solitary confinement is a severe punishment), and so you try the literary thought experiment of having one solitary man and letting him encounter animals and name them. Animals can be useful and they can be good company. But ultimately no animals, not even a dog, are fully satisfactory as partners in work and companions in life. Humans need humans. An enriching component of human relationships is sex. So, the supreme gift to the solitary man in our story is companionship with an equal who is both like and unlike; a woman. It is hardly a complete account, but it is a good start. Oh, and there is one other aspect. They should be free of the shame which lies at the root of so much psychological disorder.’  

As far as it goes, would you regard such an account as complete? If not, what would you add next? You can see where this is going. To be human you need to be responsible. So, you let the humans face the moral choice. You can even include an element of disinformation to make the choice harder. And then when it goes horribly wrong you let them discover that they are responsible for their actions, and that blaming one another does not help. If you have God in your story, then (uniquely for the humans) responsibility consists of accountability to God. This is how human distinctiveness was addressed in early Jewish thought. As an early articulation that to be human means to be responsible, the story of Adam and Eve is unsurpassed.  

In Greed is Dead, Paul Collier and John Kay reference Citizenship in a Networked Age as brilliantly elucidating the issue of morally pertinent decision-taking. They write, ‘Whatever the future capabilities of machines, they cannot be morally load-bearing because humans are self-aware and mortal, whereas machines are not. Machines can be used not only to complement and enhance human decision-making, but for bad: search optimisation has already morphed into influence-optimisation. We must keep morally pertinent decision-taking firmly in the domain of humanity.’  

The nature of humanity includes responsibility—for wise use of machine learning and much more besides. Accountability is part of life for people with widely differing philosophical, ethical, and religious world views. If we are willing to concede that accountability follows responsibility, then we should next ask, ‘Accountable to whom?’ 

Explainer
Biology
Culture
Ethics
9 min read

Ethics needs to catch-up with genetic innovation

Are we morally obliged to genetically edit?

John is Professor Emeritus of Cell and Molecular Biology at the University of Exeter.

An artistic visualisation of a DNA strand growing flowers from it.
Artist Nidia Dias visualises how AI could assist genomic studies.
Google Deepmind via Unsplash.

It makes me feel very old when I realise that Louise Brown, the first baby to be born via in vitro fertilisation (IVF), will be 47 years old on July 25th this year. Since her birth in 1978, over 10 million IVF-conceived babies have been born worldwide, of whom about 400,000 have been in the UK. Over that period, success rates have increased such that in some clinics, about 50 per cent of IVF cycles lead to a live birth. At the same time, there have also been significant advances in genetics, genomics and stem cell biology all of which, in relation to human embryos, raise interesting and sometimes challenging ethical issues. 

I start with a question: what is the ‘moral status’ of the early human embryo? Whether the embryo arises by normal fertilisation after sexual intercourse or by IVF, there is a phase of a few days during which the embryo is undergoing the earliest stages of development but has not yet implanted into the wall of the uterus; the prospective mother is not yet pregnant. In UK law, based on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), these early embryos are not regarded as human persons but nevertheless should be treated with some respect. Nevertheless, there are some who oppose this view and believe that from the ‘moment of conception’ (there actually isn’t such a thing – fertilisation takes several hours) embryos should be treated as persons. In ‘conventional’ IVF this debate is especially relevant to the spare embryos that are generated during each IVF cycle and which are stored, deep-frozen, in increasing numbers for possible use in the future.  

A further dimension was added to this area of debate when it became possible to test IVF embryos for the presence of genetic mutations that cause disease. This process is called pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and enables prospective parents who are at known risk of passing on a deleterious mutation to avoid having a child who possesses that mutation. But what about the embryos that are rejected? They are usually discarded or destroyed but some are used in research. However, those who hold a very conservative view of the status of the early embryo will ask what right we have to discard/destroy an embryo because it has the ‘wrong genes’. And even for the many who hold a less conservative view, there are still several questions which remain, including ‘which genetic variants we should be allowed to select against?; should we allow positive selection for genes known to promote health in some way?’; should we allow selection for non-therapeutic reasons, for example, sporting prowess?’ These questions will not go away and there are already indications that non-therapeutic selection is being offered in a small number of countries. 

Genetic modification 

This leads us on to think about altering human genes. Initially, the issue was genetic modification (GM) which in general involves adding genes. GM techniques have been used very successfully in curing several conditions, including congenital severe immune deficiency and as part of treatment programmes for certain very difficult childhood cancers. One key feature of these examples is that the genetic change is not passed on to the next generation – it just involves the body of someone who has already been born. Thus, we call them somatic genetic changes (from the Greek, sōmatikos, meaning ‘of the body’).  

Genetic modification which is passed on to the next generation is called germline GM which means that the genetic change must get into the ‘germ cells’, i.e., the sperm or egg. Currently, the only feasible way of doing this is to carry out the genetic modification on the very early embryo. At present however, with just one very specific exception, GM of human embryos is forbidden in all the countries where it would be possible to do it. There is firstly the question of deciding whether it is right to change the genetic makeup of a future human being in such a way that the change is passed to succeeding generations. Secondly, there are concerns about the long-term safety of the procedure. Although it would involve adding specific genes with known effects, the complexity of genetic regulation and gene interactions during human development means that scientist are concerned about the risks of unforeseen effects. And thirdly, germline GM emphasises dramatically the possibility of using GM for enhancement rather than for medical reasons.  

Genome editing 

This leads us to think about genome editing. In 2011, it was shown that a bacterial system which edits the genomes of invading viruses could also work in other organisms This opened up a large array of applications in research, agriculture and medicine. However, the ethical issues raised by genome editing are, in essence, the same as raised by GM and so there is still a universal prohibition of using the technique with human embryos: germline genome editing is forbidden. Despite this, a Chinese medical scientist, He Jiankui, announced in 2018 that he had edited the genomes of several embryos, making them resistant to HIV; two babies with edited genomes had already been born while several more were on the way. The announcement caused outrage across the world, including in China itself. He Jiankui was removed from his job and then, after a trial, was imprisoned for three years; his two colleagues who collaborated in this work received shorter sentences. 

At present the universal prohibition of human germline genome editing remains in place. However, the discussion has been re-opened in a paper by an Anglo-Australian group.  They suggest that we need to develop heritable (i.e. germline) polygenic genome editing in order to reduce significantly an individual's risk of developing degenerative diseases. These includecoronary artery disease, Alzheimer’s disease, major depressive disorder, diabetes and schizophrenia. I note in passing that one of the authors is Julian Savulescu at Oxford who is already well-known for his view that parents who are able to do so, are ‘morally obliged’ to seek to have genetically enhanced children, whether by PGD, GM or genome editing. The use of polygenic editing, which would, in all likelihood, be available only to the (wealthy) few, fits in well with his overall ethical position. Needless to say, the paper, published in the prestigious journal Nature, attracted a lot of attention in the world of medical genetics. It was not however, universally welcomed – far from it. Another international group of medical scientists and ethicists has stated that ‘Human embryo editing against disease is unsafe and unproven …’ and even go as far as to suggest that the technology is ‘… going to be taken up by people who are pushing a eugenics agenda …’ remain very pertinent. 

Harder still and harder 

I have no doubt that amongst different reader there will be a range of opinions about the topics discussed so far. For anyone who is Christian (or indeed an adherent of almost any religious faith), one of the difficulties is that modern science, technology and medicine have thrown up ethical questions that could not have even been dreamed of by the writers of the Bible (or of other religious texts). We just have to use our wisdom, knowledge and general moral compass (and for some, prayer) to try to reach a decision. And if what I have already written makes that difficult, some recent developments multiply that difficulty still more.  

In the early years of this century, scientists developed methods of transforming a range of human cells into ‘pluripotent’ stem cells, i.e., cells capable of growing into a wide range of cell types. It also became possible to get both induced stem cells and natural stem cells to develop into functional differentiated cells corresponding to specific body tissues. This has huge potential for repairing damaged organs. However, other applications are potentially much more controversial. In 2023, Cambridge scientists reported that they had used stem cells to create synthetic mouse embryos which progressed at least as far as brain and heart formation within the normal pattern of mouse embryo development. 

At about the same time, the Cambridge group used individual human embryonic stem cells (from the blastocyst stage of embryonic development), to ‘grow’ early human embryos in the lab. There is no intention to use these embryos to start a pregnancy – indeed, it would be illegal to do so – but instead to study a period of embryo development which is not permitted with ‘real’ human embryos (research must not continue past 14 days of development). But how should we regard synthetic embryos? What is their moral status? For those who hold a conservative view of the normal human embryo (see earlier), should we regard these synthetic embryos as persons? Neither does the law help us. The legal frameworks covering in vitro fertilisation and early embryos (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts, 1990, 2008) do not cover artificial embryos – they were unknown at the times the legislation was drawn up. Indeed, synthetic embryos/embryo models are, in law, not actually embryos, however much they look like/behave like early embryos. Earlier this month, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) discussed these developments with a view to recommending new legislation, but this will not dispel an unease felt by some people, including the science correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, who wrote that this research is irresponsible.  

But there is more. In addition to synthetic embryos, the HFEA also discussed, the possible use of gametes – eggs and sperm – grown from somatic stem cells (e.g., from skin) in the lab. Some authors have suggested that the production of gametes in vitro is the ‘Holy Grail’ of fertility research. I am not so sure about that but it is clear that a lot of effort is going into this research. Success so far is limited to the birth of several baby mice, ‘conceived’ via lab-grown eggs and normal sperm. Nevertheless, it is predicted that lab-grown human eggs and sperm will be available within a decade. Indeed, several clinicians have suggested that these ‘IVGs’ (in vitro gametes) seem destined to become “a routine part of clinical practice”.  

The lab-grown gametes would be used in otherwise normal IVF procedures, the only novelty being the ‘history’ of the eggs and/or sperm. Clinicians have suggested that this could help couples in which one or both were unable to produce the relevant gamete, but who still wanted to have children. In this application, the use of IVGs poses no new ethical questions although we may be concerned about the possibility of the gametes carrying new genetic mutations. However, some of the more wide-ranging scenarios do at the least make us to stop and think. For example, it would be possible for a same-sex couple to have a child with both of them being a genetic parent (obviously for males, this would also involve a surrogate mother). More extremely, a person could have a child of which he or she was actually, in strictly genetic terms, both the ‘father’ and the ‘mother’. What are we to make of this? Where are our limits?  

Dr Christopher Wild, former director of International Agency for Research on Cancer, explores in depth many of the developments and issue I outlined above. His article on why a theology of embryos is needed, is clear, well-written, helpful and thought-provoking. 

 

This article is based on a longer blog post with full footnotes.  

Join with us - Behind the Seen

Seen & Unseen is free for everyone and is made possible through the generosity of our amazing community of supporters.

If you’re enjoying Seen & Unseen, would you consider making a gift towards our work?

Alongside other benefits (book discounts etc.), you’ll receive an extra fortnightly email from me sharing what I’m reading and my reflections on the ideas that are shaping our times.

Graham Tomlin

Editor-in-Chief