Interview
America
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16 min read

Is reconciliation possible in America’s culture wars?

Understanding a strange kingdom of anxiety and belligerence.

Miroslav Volf is Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School and is the Founder and Director of the Yale Center for Faith and Culture.

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Miroslav Volf grew up in Croatia and is now Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale University, and the Director of the Yale Center for Faith and Culture. He is the author of many books and is one of the USA’s most prominent public intellectuals. Graham Tomlin recently met up with him to discuss life, politics and faith in the USA during this pivotal election year. 

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Graham: So great to see you today, Miroslav. 

Miroslav: It's always wonderful to see you too. 

I want to talk to you about life in the USA in this election year and some of the issues surrounding that. What do you feel is the mood in the USA at the moment as the election approaches? 

It's tough to describe it, but I would say that predominantly it's a mix of belligerence along with apprehensiveness and uncertainty. I think the American left isn't the happiest with its candidate. They wonder whether Joe Biden can win against Trump, and whether he is too old to be president. On the other side, I see a certain kind of triumphalism and an increasing radicalism, and that is, for many people, worrisome. I also note a willingness to fight. And then there are some, among them some of my colleagues at Yale, who are determined to leave the country if things don't turn out quite the way that they hope! I tell them that I'm used to living under authoritarian regimes - that's how I grew up - and it's possible! Perhaps also responsible.  

Back in 1996 you published your book Exclusion and Embrace, which largely came out of your experience of the war between Croatia and Serbia, and before that, living, as you say, under a totalitarian regime in eastern Europe. I was struck by a question you asked there: “what kind of selves do we need to be to live in harmony with others?” I wonder how you reflect on writing that book now in the context of contemporary America, which seems much more polarised than it was back in 1996? Is there some of that work that resonates particularly with the US situation right now? 

I think so.  Some eight years ago - I'm not sure exactly where to draw the line - I sensed that the political fronts were hardening. They have since become almost completely mutually closed. Any movement toward the middle, towards reconciling, is experienced as a defection and weakening of one’s side.  

I have felt it before, in the former Yugoslavia. When I wrote the book advocating “embrace,” it fell on deaf ears - for Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. The book was written and published as the war was going and had barely ended and my compatriots felt that I was taking away their enemy; they were invested in having one. The time for reconcilers comes when fronts have gotten a little bit more porous than in situations like the one I've just described, which is to say that the time for reconcilers is ‘ordinary time’, rather than making interventions in the actual situation of conflict.  

As to the kinds of selves we need to be, whether in conflict or before or after it, I think it's being people who resist themselves becoming closed by the boundaries of the combatants in the fight, people who are able to see beyond the seen to the unseen, as it were, who hope for the unhoped for and who have the moral ground on which they stand, whose “will to embrace” has not been undermined by violence. 

In that book you also wrote about repentance and forgiveness as being crucial elements in reconciliation. Do you see much evidence of repentance and forgiveness within the USA right now? If not, what would it take to bring about that kind of culture within American life?  

I don't see much willingness. I see the culture becoming increasingly unforgiving. There are, of course, ritualistic gestures of forgiveness in different domains of life, but they're really public image management tools rather than steps toward reconciliation.  

Some of the resistance to forgiveness is a function of the conflict, as I noted earlier. In cultures of late modernity, I see another reason for resistance.  For the most part, we operate with the narrative account of the self: ‘I am what I have done, what has been done to me, what I have made out of what I've done and what others have done to me.’ But if you have this notion of the self, how do you do what the miracle of forgiveness requires? How do you unglue the past deed from the self that has committed that deed, when that deed is—by definition— defining of the person?  Forgiveness requires a vision of the self that isn’t defined by its acts.  For Christians, God’s unconditional love defines the self. That emphasises the importance of the Christian message and deep theological reflection on it to make such an account of the self plausible. 

And to take that idea further, much of our identity politics language tries to isolate one particular aspect of a person's self, and so that's the only thing I need to know about. So, I might say to you: I know what you're like. You're Croatian and therefore I can either say you're one of my tribe or you're not one of my tribe and I can either shun you or accept you that way. But of course, we are, as people, much more complex than that. We're much more multifaceted. We have different identities that are not just about nationality, but they're about relationship, embeddedness within society, political or family allegiances and all kinds of different facets of our selves. That trend to isolate one aspect of the self as definitive is surely quite unhelpful in enabling us to engage with each other as persons, as opposed to just a projection of our imagination? 

 It's a kind of betrayal of the particularity of the self and an inability to perceive the person as the particular individual that they are. I think that's also the case in ethnic or political conflicts. I remember during the war in the former Yugoslavia, saying to my fellow Croatians: “To be a Croatian is, almost by definition, to have Serbs as your neighbours.”  But, obviously, in the situation of conflict, the last thing you want to hear is that you have been defined by your relationship to the person whom you now want to obliterate! 

Exactly. And you can see that same dynamic playing out in the Israel-Gaza situation right now. In many ways, Israel is defined by its relationship with the Palestinians, and Palestinians are defined by their relationship with Israelis, and you can't get away from that.  

These days we often hear about culture wars. Progressives and conservatives offer different visions of the future. In the United States that seems a very polarised, toxic debate. Do you think that Christian faith offers a different path from either? Does it beckon us on a third path that is different from the conservative and the progressive polarity? 

Yes, it does, especially with hardened polarities of this sort. You know the old adage – “I don't care what's left and what's right; I care for what's right and what's wrong.” This right / wrong contrast, this dualistic moralism of religious traditions, can obviously be lived in different ways. But if we understand it in the properly Christian way, with humility, the contrast between right and wrong seems to me important because it provides us an independent place on which to stand and from which to open up a space for movement in this rather sterile conflict, or at least not to let ourselves be drawn into it.  

To nurture such Christian independence, we need to return to the big question that Dietrich Bonhoeffer asked toward the end of his imprisonment: “Who is Jesus Christ for us today?” That seems to me to be a central question, and it helps avoid the temptation of the church—as you see happening in the United States on both sides, left and right—to a certain kind of identification with the politics of a cause. 

I don't know if you've seen this book The Kingdom, the Power and the Glory: American Evangelicals in an Age of Extremism, by Tim Alberta, which is very interesting. He’s a staff writer for The Atlantic, and this is his second book, looking primarily at the evangelicalism’s betrayal of the gospel, “thinning out,” so to speak, into a nationalist civil religion. 

The idea of the “stranger King,” suggests that we are in a kind of revolutionary situation. 

People in the UK often wonder how the Evangelical Church in the USA seems so solidly behind Donald Trump, who shows no particular sign of Christian, or evangelical faith. Clearly he will endorse certain conservative positions which evangelicals are in favour of, but is there something deeper going on than that? How do you read the Evangelical support for Donald Trump? 

I think it’s not only true of evangelicalism in this country, but in other settings, and it is also true of other Christian (and even more broadly, religious) traditions—that the nation ends up being a much more powerful god than the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. So, when there's a sense of threat, everybody coalesces around defence of that political in-group.  

My colleague here at Yale, the sociologist Phil Gorski, has written this interesting article “The Return of the King”. He talks about the shift from disenchantment and secularisation to a new immanentism in the U.S. today. He also invokes the vision, from ancient pagan cultures, of a ‘stranger King,’ who is not so much a sacred king, as in Christian understanding, one responsible to God, but a divine figure, who comes from nowhere, from outside, and who is seen as a rescuer, with divine powers that are above moral scrutiny. 

I think that speaks of the way in which people understand Trump. It doesn't matter how he behaves; he can do as he wishes. He could, as he put it early on, even before he became president, kill somebody in the middle of New York and that wouldn’t impact how people view him. We know about his sexual escapades and the lawsuits, and they don’t impact how he is seen by his supporters.  

The idea of the “stranger King,” suggests that we are in a kind of revolutionary situation. Steve Bannon is a very good example. He says he is a kind of Leninist who wants to take control of the state apparatus and dismantle everything. So, there's been a certain radicalism that is obsessed with power. I think that's where Trump has come in. And he has found religious interpreters who have helped him emerge as a new King Cyrus, or somebody who need not be held to moral standards because he is what is perceived to be needed right now. 

The idea of a re-paganisation is very interesting. Here in the UK, many people observed that Boris Johnson was the one Prime Minister in recent times (unlike Blair, Brown, May, Sunak) who did not really profess any very obvious religious faith. His great heroes are in fact, the classical pagan writers of Rome and Greece. There was no great idea for political harmony or vision there. It was more about holding power for its own sake in some Nietzschean sense. 

At least a few years back, some of the neo-pagan philosophers, like Alain de Benoist, who wrote, among other things, a book titled On Being a Pagan (which built partly on Heidegger and mainly on a certain interpretation of Nietzsche), were popular in hard-right circles. De Benoist sees himself very much as retrieving paganism, in sharp contrast to monotheism.   

One of the themes you mentioned a moment ago was that of the nation. One thing that strikes us on this side of the pond looking at America is a very strong brand of Christian nationalism. American churches often have a flag at the front, and presumably this idea of a Christian nation goes back to the Puritan vision that founded America. How do you read that theologically? Do you see the nation as a positive thing or a negative thing? Is it something we should be suspicious of? Is it something that should be embraced?  

I'm disappointed to see the nation turning into what seems like the supreme good.  I find it useful to differentiate between “patriotism” and “nationalism,” though this is somewhat arbitrary linguistically. If one went with that distinction, “nationalism” would be particularistic and exclusivist, and a nationalist would have a “national” God; “patriotism” would describe commitment to one’s own nation in the community of all nations, and a “patriot” would worship the God of all nations.  I think that Christians have universal commitments in the sense that there are no moral insiders and moral outsiders.  This kind of universalism is rooted in the simple conviction that each one of us is created in the image of God, who created all of us, and in the belief that Christ died for each one of us and was raised for our justification. I cannot place relative values on people based on their proximity to me. What I can have, is a greater responsibility for those with whom I live, those “whose lives are closely linked with ours,” as we pray in Episcopal and Anglican liturgy.  

What I find problematic is not just the “America first” kind of particularism (which sometimes goes along with isolationism).  Problematic also is the “America, the best” kind of universalism (which often goes along with expansionism).  One is withdrawing, the other is aggressive, but in both we are interested, above all, in ourselves and our own well-being. I think we need a world order in which we can affirm the equal dignity of every single human being — so that the life of my compatriot is not worth more than the life of those on the other side of my nation’s borders.  Equal dignity would also require that we care in a special way for those whose lives and conditions of life have been curtailed by the way we have exercised political power historically.   

The other aspect of this is surely that the Church is itself a multinational community. In the Christian Church, as they say, water is thicker than blood - in other words the water of baptism that binds us is stronger than differences of ethnicity and nationality. The church is a community that reaches across every nation of the world. These bonds are stronger than any other, and that relativizes the nation as an entity that defines us. It doesn't mean we can’t have a certain patriotic pride in our nation, or our place of origin. The particularity of that is a good thing - we're all rooted in places and histories, which are a part of who we are, but being Christian and therefore bound to each other relativizes the idea of the nation as what ultimately defines us as a people. 

 Agreed. 

You wonder what it would be like if across the culture wars we could recognise each other's Christian faith as being a stronger bond than the ideological differences that divide us? 

Or in situations of conflict - if we could recognise the value of a person of my ethnic group and someone of another ethnic group as exactly the same. That would have profound implications, even when we engage in what we might deem to be a just war.  How war is conducted would be greatly changed if we thought of one side and the other in that way, that each individual is of absolutely equal value. 

World altering and disorienting processes are under way, which I think partly underpin those political tensions, and we need to cast our eyes to that which lies underneath political tensions and to what can take us out of them. 

One of the other themes I wanted to explore was one of the casualties of our modern political life - Truth. We talk about living in a post-truth age. A huge volume of opinion, ideas and data comes at us every day because of the information revolution of the internet, social media and so on. The question is: why does truth matter in politics? I recall something you wrote in Exclusion and Embrace: “if argument cannot win, weapons must.” Once truth goes always leads to violence. So, could you just expand on that a little bit and explore that theme in the context of our political life?  

The stance that people often embrace in conflict is this: “If truth is against me, why should I be for the truth?”  And so, truth becomes a casualty of my own interest. We can observe that from a little kid, telling an “innocent” lie, all the way to the workings of the propaganda machinery in world politics. In a way, a lie is an homage to the truth, because a lie presents itself as truth.  A good deal of the tensions in the USA are rooted in an inability to trust that what the other person says is correct, so that there is this mood of suspicion that nibbles away any trust that may be built. It may be important to remember what Jesus said about truth — that it will set us free.  The truth sets each one of us free precisely by binding us to one another in trust. 

That begins to open up one last area I wanted to explore with you. You run a course in Yale University called Life Worth Living, which you offer for students who want to explore some of the deeper questions as to what makes a life worth living. I'd love you to just explain a bit about how that course works, but particularly bearing in mind the theme we're talking about today. What is a life worth living in this particular moment in the context of the USA? You talked at the beginning about how you’ve lived under totalitarian regimes, and that it's possible to live a good life even in really difficult circumstances. What does that life look like at the moment?  

I think of that course as a kind of exercise in truth-seeking conversations, in speaking about what matters most to us in life with those who disagree with us. The course is offered to Yale College students, undergrads, primarily. We may have seven or so seminar groups each semester, all populated by students from different cultures, embracing different faiths or none, and we discuss in sequence various competing visions of the good life on offer.  When I teach the class, I tell the students that, of the traditions we are exploring —  Buddhism, Christianity, Islam or Nietzsche’s philosophy — all make truth claims.  Which is to say that they are talking about the truthfulness of each of our lives. Our goal in class is to wrestle with these truth claims not just intellectually but also, and even primarily, existentially.   

This is a very important exercise in how one can, in a pluralistic setting, affirm the truth and stay by it, while at the same time entertaining seriously the opinions of others, even adjusting one's own perspectives in the light of the perspectives of others.  We need these kinds of skills given our profound disagreements on political, economic, and life-orientation issues.   

 So a life worth living would be a life where you can have those kind of conversations? 

Certainly.  These kinds of conversations and the kinds of deep but humble commitments to truth and to honoring others irrespective of whether we agree with them or not are a key element of a life that is worthy of our humanity.  At the political level, they are a condition of the possibility of envisioning and moving toward a common future.  

Do you see any signs of hope of this kind of discourse within the USA? You started off by saying how there's a sense of anxiety and belligerence. Are there signs that give you just a little glimmer of hope that there may be a different future going forward? 

Well, when I speak about the class to people, I don't see them yawning, nor do I detect wistfulness in their eyes, as if this were somehow unrelated to real life.  I see people listening and wanting to move in that direction, entertaining it as a possibility. When I talk in churches about the question “Who is Jesus Christ for us today?”, I don't find resistance. I find people saying — yeah, that's what we need to take seriously, because we are living in a kind of dystopian period.  

Our problems today are not just hardened political fronts and the emergence of civilizational nations with authoritarian leaders.  World altering and disorienting processes are under way, which I think partly underpin those political tensions, and we need to cast our eyes to that which lies underneath political tensions and to what can take us out of them.  Generative AI!  Imploding environment!  Tremendous disparities in wealth! These are things that will profoundly shape our future, and we need to know how to talk about them notwithstanding the deep disagreements we have.  We also need to nurture a Christian imagination, a hope for the world that the New Testament sketches — largely symbolically — at the end of the book of Revelation.  People today resonate with these kinds of themes, and that gives me hope.  

It has been good to end on this longer term note. One thing that Christian faith does - is it thinks long term. It doesn't think in electoral cycles, it thinks more in centuries than years or even decades, so getting that bigger perspective is really helpful. 

Thank you Miroslav for your time and your insights into our times.  

Thank you for the conversation. It's always great to talk to you. 

Miroslav Volf

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Miroslav Volf.
Essay
Comment
Identity
Nationalism
Politics
15 min read

Could a constitution capture the essence of Englishness?

A proposal for St George’s Day.
A St George's Cross flag flutters on a tower.
St Helen's Church, Welton, Yorkshire.
Different Resonance on Unsplash.

Somewhere behind the concrete-and-glass façade of modern official Britain, one can still find some traces of England: folklore and folk music, country customs and local traditions – wassailing, maypoles, cheese rolling and bounds beating – that neither brutal 19th century industrialisation nor callous 20th century deindustrialisation could completely erase.  

This idealised ‘Quaintshire England’ lurks somewhere in the psycho-geographic triangle formed by Anthony Trollope’s Barchester, Thomas Hardy’s Casterbridge and Geraldine Granger’s Dibley. It is always indeterminately, reassuringly, old. It has a lot of past, but not much future. Yet its traditions are neither stagnant nor dying. Take, for example, the recognition of St George’s Day. Once upon a time, and not so very long ago, St George’s Day came and went with hardly anyone noticing. It was relegated to handful of nasty, shaven-headed, right-wing cranks. Now St George’s Day is marked by respectable newspapers and by the media classes, through the annual ritual of the Great Debate About Englishness.  

For those not familiar, the Great Debate About Englishness takes the form of a stylised conflict between two sides: the Guardians and the Telegraphs. The Guardians start, with a stick-knocking assault on Saint George and all his works: he was Turkish (or, better still, Palestinian); he never visited England (which is just as well, because, as they are eager to insist, England does not really exist anyway, and if it did it would be hopelessly white and racist). Then the Telegraphs move forward, with Scruton bells on their toes, to lament the fact that we no longer celebrate St George, and how all the ills of the world are the fault of the kind of people who say ‘Mumbai’ when they mean ‘Bombay’. At this, the Guardians caper forth, wielding Billy Bragg quotes about ‘progressive Englishness’ in an intricate manoeuvre known to afficionados as a ‘Full Toynbee’. This done, the Guardians retreat before the onslaught of the Telegraphs, who counter-attack with the clincher than English is an ethnic marker, which necessarily excludes anyone whose ancestors were swarthier than a Flemish Huguenot. So concludes the ritual, which is then forgotten about until the following year. 

England, becoming everything, has thereby become nothing. It is the only nation in the United Kingdom without a political life of its own. 

These cathartic ritual confrontations rarely acknowledge that debating the nature of Englishness is itself a symptom of the English nation’s statelessness. Like Kashmiris, Kurds and Uyghurs, the English must debate the nature of their existence because England is – to borrow the term used by Austrian Chancellor Metternich to refer to pre-unification Italy – ‘a geographical expression’.  

The institutions, symbols, and icons of political identity are all British. Despite its historical position at the core of the Union and the Empire, England remains a curiously under-developed nation in constitutional terms. It has almost no formal recognition as a national community. Indeed, England’s dominance over the United Kingdom has had the paradoxical effect of denying England – as England ­– a voice in its own affairs. England, becoming everything, has thereby become nothing. It is the only nation in the United Kingdom without a political life of its own. There is no English Government, nor English Parliament. Even the banal markers of national identity that people might have in their pockets, like coins, stamps, and passport, are British, not English. The absence of such markers means that English identity has high barriers to entry. In other words, we obsess about the ethnic and cultural boundaries of Englishness, because there is no English civic, legal, or political community – let us call it a ‘constitutional community’ – of which one can be a member as a matter of legal right.  

Such a ‘constitutional community’ could take two forms. It might take the form of an independent England, re-founded as a nation-state after Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have freely gone their separate ways. Alternatively, given the need for collective defence and international clout in a dangerous world, it could take the form of an England which remains one of four constituent states in a voluntary, equal, confederal Union.  

Either way, an English constitution, understood as a codified supreme and fundamental law, should establish political institutions of England’s own: an English Parliament, an English government, an English judiciary, and an English civil service. Only by this constitutional means can England, now that the British Empire is no more, become a normal nation, make peace with itself, and re-find its place in Europe and the world.  

In part, this is a matter of good government. As the great post-war Commonwealth constitutional scholar Sir Ivor Jennings famously put it, ‘A Constitution is but a means to an end, and the end is good government.’ An English constitution would enable the renewal of a system of government that has become too centralised, too top heavy, and long overdue for reform. It would clarify the rules of political life where these have become contested, reinforce the boundaries of power where these boundaries have been pushed to breaking point, and restate the principles of public ethics which have been neglected. It would protect democratic institutions and norms from erosion by unscrupulous authoritarian populists.  

A list of priorities for consideration in an English constitution, enjoying support across the broad centre of the political spectrum, might include devolution to English cities and counties, electoral reform, reform of the Lords, codification of parliamentary conventions to limit the abuse of Crown Prerogatives, strengthening of the civil service and rebuilding of lost state capacity, restoring standards in public life, and better protection of civil liberties.  

If you are reading this in England...  you are probably not very far away from a place where old stones echo with the words and songs, the faith and the prayers, that have held the English nation together. 

Yet constitutions are more than dull, dry, legal charters of government. They are also national covenants. They set out a vision of who we are, who we want to be, what we stand for, and what we will not stand for. Aside from all the mechanical, institutional, provisions one expects to find in a written constitution, constitutions also contain what we might call metaphysical provisions: those that bear the identity, and bare the soul, of the nation. An English constitution would help to anchor English identity in the midst of changing times. 

While the mechanical constitution is in need of reform, England’s ‘metaphysical constitution’ is not so lightly to be tinkered with. It represents a mystical union of past, present and future, embodying an idea of English nationhood – and English statehood – stretching back to Anglo-Saxon times. At the heart of this metaphysical constitution is the ideal of Christian monarchy, institutionalised through constitutional relationships between the church, state, Crown and nation.  

While the institutional structures of the mechanical constitution are British – and essentially imperial, rather than national, in character – the metaphysical constitution has remained steadfastly English. The Church of England is the only major all-England public institution. The General Synod, which has power to enact Measures having the force of law in England in relation to ecclesiastical matters, is the only England-wide legislative body. England (not Britain, nor the United Kingdom, nor the British Empire, but something older and deeper) can most readily be found in its great cathedrals: Salisbury, Norwich, Wells, Lincoln, Ely, Gloucester, Hereford, Durham. It can be found, too, in the abundance of ancient village parish churches with hand-tapestried hassocks, musty smells, memorial plaques and an almost tangible presence of congregants gone by. England is etched in the moss and lichen of their old gravestones. It is haunted by the Ghosts of England Past, speaking the words of the Book of Common Prayer and the King James Bible. If you listen carefully, you can hear them. If you are reading this in England, even in the midst of a busy city, you are probably not very far away from a place where old stones echo with the words and songs, the faith and the prayers, that have held the English nation together over the centuries. 

Confusion arises, however, from the failure to distinguish between the mechanical and the metaphysical aspects of constitutions. 

That heritage is valued not only by Christians, but also by those who are not believing or practising Christians, but who are pleased to belong to a culture that has been shaped by Christianity. Cutting the Church totally loose from the state, by disestablishment, would abandon custody of this cultural and social heritage to a merely private organisation, having no public recognition, patronage, or connection to the national community. That would be a particularly savage form of cultural privatisation. 

England’s metaphysical constitution is mostly buried beneath the accumulation of ages. If you are good with the constitutional trowel, however, and know where to dig, it is not hard to unearth it. Sometimes it even pokes above ground, as easily seen as the billowy bench of bishops in the House of Lords. The topsoil of modernity is dramatically stripped away at the coronation, when the king swears not only to govern ‘according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on and the Laws and Customs of the same’, and to ‘cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all [his] judgments’, but also to ‘maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel, and the Protestant Reformed Religion established by law’. The King’s covenant with God and the nation is outwardly and visibly signified when, at the climax of the ceremony, he is anointed, by the Archbishop of Canterbury, with holy oil.  

Thus, the descendants, according to the flesh, of Anglo-Saxon kings, become at their coronation the descendants, according to the spirit, of David and Solomon. The birth of this metaphysical constitution can be traced to the baptism of King Aethelbert, the first Anglo-Saxon king to become Christian. As Bijan Omrani notes, in God is an Englishman, this act transformed the nature and expectations of English kingship, from pagan warlordism to a holy kingly office, responsible under God for bringing God’s peace and justice to England.  

All this is very strange, and easy to mock. To paraphrase a famous scene in Monty Python’s ‘Holy Grail’, ‘supreme executive power derives from the confidence of the House of Commons, not from some farcical aquatic ceremony’. From a purely mechanical point of view, that is of course quite right. As Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution said of Sir Robert Walpole, the first modern Prime Minister, ‘he ruled England because he ruled that House’. Confusion arises, however, from the failure to distinguish between the mechanical and the metaphysical aspects of constitutions. Many constitutional conservatives, eager to uphold the metaphysical constitution of England’s Christian monarchy, set their face against even moderate and beneficial reforms to the mechanical constitution. On the other hand, many constitutional reformers, eager to mend the broken mechanical constitution, would pave over the metaphysical constitution with all the misplaced zeal of a solar farm company. 

The established church is a particular target of the reformers’ wrath, evidenced most recently by a proposed amendment to the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill, seeking to remove bishops from the upper House. According to Lord Birt, former Director-General of the BBC, ‘Embedding the Church of England in our legislature is an indefensible, undemocratic anomaly.’ There are only two countries in the world, so we are informed, where clerics sit of right as legislators: the United Kingdom and Iran. The clear implication is that this connection puts the United Kingdom in bad company, as if having a couple of dozen bishops in the House of Lords were comparable to the rule of Ayatollahs. 

Incidentally, remarkably incurious of comparative practice, the people who say this always forget about Belize: a relatively stable and well-functioning Westminster Model democracy, whose tiny upper House includes a Senator nominated by the Belize Council of Churches and Evangelical Association of Churches. They also forget about tiny Tuvalu, a democratic Commonwealth Realm in the South Pacific, where the established church was planted by the London Missionary Society. Perhaps these examples do not fit the narrative that insists that church establishment must inherently be regressive and anti-democratic. 

To those of us who must live also in the here-and-now, not only as Christians but also as citizens of a particular nation and polity, it all looks very bleak.

Even without deliberate abolition, we must nevertheless admit that the metaphysical constitution of England, no less than the material constitution, is in crisis. The most recent census showed that, for the first time since the conversion of Anglo-Saxon England, Christians are now a nominal minority. Of course, the invisible church of born-again Spirit-filled believers was probably always a minority of the population, in England as in any nation. Nevertheless, from the Early Middle Ages until just a few generations ago, nominal Christianity was the norm, and Christian ideas held sway over the narratives, ethics, and assumptions of English society. Not everyone conformed to a model of Christian holiness and goodness – far from it – but there was a common view, shaped by the pervasive cultural, social, and educational influence of Christianity, of what holiness and goodness looked like

That Christian consensus is what has been lost in the social and demographic change – some might call it, a cultural revolution – since the 1960s. The Church of England is still doing excellent work in parishes up and down the land, multiplying the loaves and fishes of its limited resources to provide everything from foodbanks and debt advisory services to parent-toddler groups and pensioners’ clubs, filling the social gap that a failing state no longer even tries to fill. Yet, numerically, the Church of England – except in a few bright pockets of revival – is in free-fall. In the lands of St Ethelbert, St Edmund, and St Cuthbert, empty church buildings have been turned into private houses, gyms, carpet warehouses, soft play centres, mosques, pubs and nightclubs. Looking at things through a spiritual rather than natural lens, we should not be discouraged. We can of course have confidence that the risen King has triumphed, is triumphing, and will ultimately triumph – reconciling all things to the Father, and restoring the whole cosmos to glory. Nevertheless, to those of us who must live also in the here-and-now, not only as Christians but also as citizens of a particular nation and polity, it all looks very bleak. It is a spiritual trial, but a civilisational tragedy. 

Christianity – in particular in the form of mainline Protestantism - has provided the moral, ethical, sociological and institutional props on which constitutional democracy in the Anglosphere was built. Remove those props, and the whole edifice becomes a lot less stable. When we look at the egregious behaviour of Trump and his ilk, we get a taste of how rotten pagan politics would be, unseasoned and unpreserved by the salt and light of Christianity. 

This is, of course, is not to say one cannot have democracies in societies where Christianity has been less historically prevalent. Democracy can exist in a wide range of religious cultures, including in majority Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Nevertheless, at least within the Westminster Model, it depends upon an institutional subculture - a set of norms, values, traditions, expectations - which, even if successfully transplanted and adapted to different contexts, owe a lot to the kinds of Christianity that emerged from the English Reformation. The restoration of England’s Christian metaphysical constitution is, therefore, integral to restoring the health of the democratic mechanical constitution. By the works of the law – even constitutional law – shall no flesh be justified. Any constitutional refoundation of English democracy worthy of the name must be led and accompanied by a revival of the English Church and by the re-evangelisation of the English people.  

The cross atop the crown represents the principle that public authority has itself been humbled and crucified; the state exists not to be served but to serve the public

his case must be made with careful nuance. It could be misconstrued as an apology for Christian nationalism. Sadly, those who make the most noise about ‘Christian values’ all too often seem, judging by their attitudes and actions, to be reading a different gospel – one from which the Magnificat and the Sermon on the Mount have been expunged. It is galling to watch far-right authoritarian reactionaries parading their Christianity for public display, while pursuing compassionless policies that hurt the poor, the disabled, and outsiders.  

A restoration of England’s Christian metaphysical constitution would not limit freedom of religion, nor diminish the equal rights of all citizens regardless of their religion or lack thereof. The principles of religious liberty and non-discrimination, which go back to Catholic Emancipation and to the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in the early nineteenth century, should be guaranteed. Rather, establishment would simply give honourable public recognition to the place of Christianity in the nation’s heritage, grounding the state upon a core of shared Christian values, norms and traditions. If that core is maintained, tolerance and diversity can be built upon it, without undermining the nation’s historic character. In practice, this might involve a more prominent role for Christianity in public life. Public authorities might pay more attention, in their official pronouncements, to the church calendar, and less to those of other faiths, or of post-Christian causes. There might be a more obvious Christian influence in education. One of the by-products of the 1960s cultural revolution is that the clergy have retreated into a narrowly defined churchy role: the academic and the school master in holy orders have all-but vanished. Public broadcasting, too, might return to the broadly Christian assumptions of Lord Reith.  

One of the constitutional functions of an established church is to act as a reminder: to remind the King, Ministers, parliamentarians, civil servants, judges, magistrates, councillors, police constables, teachers, opinion-formers, and every citizen, that to govern is to serve. The cross atop the crown represents the principle that public authority has itself been humbled and crucified; the state exists not to be served but to serve the public. Without such a concept of ethically responsible servant leadership – grounded upon truth, justice, and compassion – democracy can easily deteriorate into cruel, crude, and crass populist perversions of itself.  

Another constitutional function of an established church is to remind us what freedom is for. If applied as mere abstractions, shorn from the Christian root from which they have sprung, and the teleological objectives towards which they point, human rights – valuable as they are – can produce absurd results, actually harming, rather than protecting, freedoms of conscience and expression. Taking the metaphysical constitution seriously again would certainly mean interpreting and enforcing our human rights laws in ways congruent to the Christian principles upon which they are based. After all, it is very odd, in a country where the king has sworn to maintain the true profession of the gospel, that people are being arrested for silent prayer, and that local councils are trying to ban street evangelism. 

Finally, the metaphysical constitution, no less than the mechanical, needs checks and balances. The church cannot perform this constitutional function, as the ethical conscience of the state, if it is – like, say, the Russian Orthodox Church – dependent upon the state. The establishment of the church must not, therefore, compromise the autonomy of the church, to govern itself synodically, and to choose its own bishops. The current process of episcopal selection through the Crown Nominations Commission might leave much to be desired, but going back to the days of political appointment by the Prime Minister is not a viable option. Rather, the principle should be acknowledged, at a constitutional level, that – in the words of Magna Carta - Anglicana ecclesia libera sit: the Church of England shall be free. If we can create constitutional rules that enable judicial independence, and the impartiality of bodies such as the Electoral Commission, we should be able to square this constitutional circle, too.