Column
Comment
General Election 24
Politics
4 min read

Who’s right when hurling charges of hypocrisy?

Accusations highlight the risk of self-deception.

George is a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and an Anglican priest.

A newspaper headline, text and an image of the subject of the article.
Ashcroft's charge against Raynor.
David Yelland, X.

Lord Ashcroft launched an extraordinary new attack on Labour’s deputy leader, Angela Rayner, in the Mail on Sunday at the start of this week, claiming that his investigation into where she lived, allegedly for tax purposes, was never about money. 

“Hypocrisy was always the charge against Angela Rayner,” he intoned, “not tax avoidance… And the stain will dog her for years to come.” 

Leaving aside whether stains dog people or the other way around, this is extraordinary not because Ashcroft attacks a senior Labour figure – day follows night, etc – but because it’s the sort of volte face that journalists call a reverse ferret. 

Had Rayner been found by investigating police officers to have committed a tax-fraud or electoral offence (and, to be clear, they didn’t), we need to ask ourselves whether Ashcroft would have run with the same line.  

Imagine: “Angela Rayner has committed a crime, but this is really about hypocrisy.” Do you think he’d have gone with that? Neither do I. 

Usually, charges of hypocrisy are levelled at politicians who use social privileges to which they’re opposed in principle. 

Hypocrisy is invariably the charge when there’s nothing else to go with. And that must raise questions about what hypocrisy really is. 

It’s clearly not just about telling lies. In the first televised debate this week between Rishi Sunak and his rival for premiership, Keir Starmer, the former repeatedly (12 times) claimed that Treasury officials had independently calculated that the latter’s spending plans would add £2,000 to the tax bill of every family in the UK. A published letter subsequently showed that the Treasury had specifically told the Government that this figure was bogus and not to be used. 

Was this hypocritical? No, it was just plain wrong – in the sense of both inaccurate and immoral. The opportunity for hypocrisy came when both leaders were asked whether they would use private healthcare for a family member in need. Sunak said he would; Starmer said he wouldn’t. If Starmer now ever uses private health facilities, Mr Hypocrisy will be ringing his door bell. 

From this, we deduce that hypocrisy is pretending to be what you’re not. So Donald Trump poses as a great statesman, the saviour of his nation, but goes down for all 34 felony charges of falsifying accounts to hide his pay-off of former porn actor Stormy Daniels, in order to protect his electoral prospects. That’s hypocrisy, precisely because he’s pretending to be someone he isn’t. 

That hypocrisy is exacerbated when Trump holds up a Bible to support his authority – or, indeed, publishes his own. Likewise, when a rich TV evangelist is convicted of sexual abuse (there are, tragically, too many examples to choose from).  

By contrast, is Rayner pretending to be something she isn’t because her family has used two properties? Very probably not. Similarly, we might like to ask whether SNP deputy leader Kate Forbes is a hypocritical politician because she’s a Christian, or a hypocritical Christian because she’s a politician. Very probably neither. Being both is who she is. 

Usually, charges of hypocrisy are levelled at politicians who use social privileges to which they’re opposed in principle. Like when Labour MP Diane Abbott sent her son to a fee-paying school. Private education, like private healthcare, is only meant to be available to those who support it ideologically, rather than just financially. Otherwise, it’s hypocrisy. 

The problem here is the presumption that the private sector is only available to those who endorse it. So it’s hypocritical for socialists to use it. But that presumption moves very close to the view that working people should know their place (a social order, incidentally, that the Christian gospel defies). 

There is no inconsistency – and consequently there can be no hypocrisy – in wanting the best for our own children, while concurrently wanting the best for all children. One might even call such a policy something like levelling-up, should such a thing exist. 

We may not know what Angela Rayner’s shortcomings are, but simply having them doesn’t make her a hypocrite.

A biblical definition of hypocrisy might be the hiding of interior wickedness under an appearance of virtue. In Matthew’s gospel, it’s the charge levelled at Pharisees whose good deeds are entirely self-serving. 

In this manner, moral theology would point to hypocrisy being the fruit of pride. But simply to hide one’s own shortcomings isn’t necessarily to be construed as hypocrisy, because there’s no moral obligation to make them public.  

In that context, we may not know what Angela Rayner’s shortcomings are, but simply having them doesn’t make her a hypocrite. Otherwise, we’re all hypocrites (and there may be some truth in that). 

It reduces to resisting the temptation to point to the mote of hypocrisy in our neighbour’s eye, while failing to attend to the beam in our own. That would also be to avoid self-deception. The kind of deception that pretends that one’s actions are in the public interest, when clearly they are only serving your own. Which, neatly enough, brings us back to Lord Ashcroft. 

Snippet
Assisted dying
Care
Comment
Ethics
2 min read

Who holds the keys of death? The logic of assisted dying

The ethical principle of double effect.

Tom has a PhD in Theology and works as a hospital physician.

white pills form an angle on a blue background
Hal Gatewood on Unsplash.

Healthcare hinges on the principle of double effect. This ethical principle makes the vital distinction between intent and effect. That is, one’s intent does not always result in a single intended effect, whether foreseen or not. In taking a patient’s blood, for example, my intent is to acquire information to aid treatment. An additional effect of this process is that—almost inevitably—this patient will experience pain, albeit minor. This principle of single intent and multiple effects applies throughout the practice of caring for human bodies, in all those instances where caring for those bodies involves physical interference, from prescribing medications to surgical procedures. And, in some instances, identifying and treating symptoms (such as terminal breathlessness) involves the use of medications that, as an unintended effect, result in death. 

In the case of assisted dying, the distinction is important. The intent of assisted dying is to end pain and suffering by ending life. The ending of life is the treatment used to relieve pain and suffering. The intent is not to isolate and treat particular symptoms associated with a condition. The intent is to bring the condition itself to an end—which requires bringing the patient’s life to an end. This is not to make any judgment whatsoever about whether such a course is “right” or “wrong”, but rather to draw out the simple observation that this course involves an unprecedented change in medical practice. Assisted dying involves the categorical adoption of ending life as a possible treatment for a condition. 

This is not quite the same as the slippery slope argument; it is about the logic of assisted dying. The point I am making is this: once ending life is introduced as a treatment, the key ethical step has already been taken. Applying that treatment in other instances of “suffering” (be they mental illness or ageing, for example) does not involve any new ethical steps. It simply involves the further application of a principle that has already been adopted. Despite the considered safeguards of the bill, therefore, the moral-ethical arguments against applying this treatment more widely will, at best, stand on shaky ground. For who could be so bold as to insist on what constitutes “suffering” for an individual?  

Should the bill hold out the keys of death in this way? I can only think of One who is strong enough to wield those…