Essay
Comment
Morality
5 min read

Oppenheimer, my father, and the bomb

One week after its release, Christopher Nolan's latest blockbuster has left Luke Bretherton pondering an un-resolved disagreement with his late father and the theology of Oppenheimer's creation.

Luke Bretherton is a Professor of Moral and Political Theology and senior fellow of the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.

IMAGE

I went to see the film Oppenheimer on its opening night at my local, community run cinema in Acton in west London. It was packed. The event felt more like going to church than to the movies. The film itself is a biopic of scientist Robert J. Oppenheimer who was a pivotal figure in leading the development of nuclear weapons during World War II.

Reflecting on the film afterwards it brought to mind a difficult and never resolved argument with my late father. In the aftermath of watching the film, I realised I was still haunted by our dispute.

Our argument centred not on whether it was right to drop the bomb. Our argument was about whether it was Christian.

My father was 18 in 1945 when atomic bombs were detonated over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing over 200,000 souls. He was conscripted into the British Army that year and stationed in India. If the war had not ended, he would have been among those deployed to invade Japan.

Our argument was not just about whether it was right to drop the bomb. It was also about whether it was Christian. My father was an ardent believer who converted to Christianity in the 1950s. His Christian commitments deeply shaped every aspect of his life and work. I followed in his footsteps, and at the time of our argument I was doing a PhD in moral philosophy and theology. In part I was trying to make sense of what it meant to be a Christian in the aftermath of events like the Holocaust and the dropping of nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, events in which it seemed Christian beliefs and practices played a key part. In the film, this is marked by the stark symbolism of Oppenheimer naming the first test of the prototype nuclear weapon “Trinity” – an often used and key way in which Christian name God.

I had been learning about just war theory when the argument with my father erupted. I was having dinner with my mum and dad at their house. To give a bit of context, my father and I had a long history of sometimes bitter arguments over political matters. These began in the 1980s when I was a teenager. He thought Mrs Thatcher a hero. I did not.

I was telling them about just war theory and its history in Christian thought and practice. As with most of our arguments, we stumbled into it. I made a throwaway remark about how, in the light of just war theory, nuclear weapons were immoral and that their use in 1945 was wrong. And yes, I was probably being pompous and annoying like all those possessed of a little new knowledge and a lot of self-righteous certitude and fervour.

My dad replied with anger that I did not know what I was talking about. Didn’t I realize that if the bombs hadn’t been dropped many more would have died, including him, which meant I would not exist. Something like this argument was used in the film and was often used by Oppenheimer to justify his own involvement in developing atomic weapons.

At the time, I replied with a procedural point that nuclear weapons do not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, a key distinction in determining the morality or otherwise of targets in war. To use nuclear weapons is to deliberately intend the indiscriminate killing of the innocent. This constitutes murder and not, as the euphemism has it, unintended collateral damage. I added insult to injury by declaring that my dad’s argument was also deeply unchristian as it was a version of the ends justify the means. Was it ever right to do evil even if good might be the result? This upset my father still further. For him it was personal. It was existential. The bombs saved his life. The bombs made our life possible.

The meal, like the argument, did not end well. We had both upset my mother. She banned us from ever talking politics at the family dinner table again. It was a lifetime ban.

What dawned on me was that the question of whether it was moral to possess, let alone use, nuclear weapons was also an existential question for me. 

Afterwards I thought more about our row. I replayed the script in my head, trying to think of what I should have said. In my immaturity, I never thought to consider how I should have said it.

What dawned on me was that the question of whether it was moral to possess, let alone use nuclear weapons was also an existential question for me. It was a question of what kind of existence warranted anyone possessing nuclear weapons. To use the language of the Cold War of which I was a child: was it better to be red than dead? Was it better to be invaded and taken over by Communists and see capitalism abolished and the British nation subordinated to a foreign power or to deter this possibility by possessing nuclear weapons, weapons that threatened to destroy all life on this planet? In other words, was my way of life really worth the threat of nuclear annihilation. Was any way of life or ideology or commitment or abstract principle worth that? I concluded that it was not and promptly joined the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

I have not attended a CND rally for many years. And what happened in 1945 is more complicated than I used to think. But I still disagree with my dad and think Oppenheimer was deeply misguided. And what happened after 1945 with the advent of the nuclear arms race is not complicated. The film portrays Oppenheimer as anticipating and trying to forestall the process of one-upmanship that developing the A-bomb and then the H-bomb set in motion. He was right to do what he could to stop the arms race, even though, as the film portrays, the authorities tried to silence and marginalize him for his efforts.

Today, if my father and I were able to have the argument again, I would approach it very differently. I hope I would be less pompous, annoying, and self-righteous. But mostly, I would be more theological. I would ask him whether he thought Jesus would drop a nuclear bomb to save a life, or whether Jesus’s own life, death, and resurrection pointed in a different direction. And then see where that conversation took us.

Essay
Comment
Politics
10 min read

England needs a written constitution that defends against populism

A new resolution acknowledges what forges a sense of right and wrong.
A wide angle picture shows a king and queen on thrones before many people in ceremonial clothes.
The Opening of Parliament.
Roger Harris/House of Lords, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

New Year is often a time for reckoning and resolutions. Nations, no less than individual persons, would benefit from such an annual reckoning with themselves.  

If in life we must always strive to find some Aristotelian ‘golden mean’, between recklessness and timidity so it is in the life of states and nations. Many countries have been brought into ruin by the excess of misdirected appetites and wrongly-ordered desires: demagogues inflaming the people; oligarchs seeking to turn the res publica – the ‘public thing’ – into their own personal fiefdom. Revolutions, corruption and public lassitude are the wages of such sins. Ultimately, it ends in the death of the state itself: the collapse of all legitimate authority into warring gangs, while refugees flee, if they can, to the borders. 

Many countries, conversely, go through their lives in cowed timidity, until they end up in an old age of regret, having never achieved their full potential. These nations do not necessarily collapse, but slowly decline – unable to reform themselves, locked in a vision of their past that was better than their present or any imaginable future.  

 England is at risk of both these dangers. On the one hand, a reckless reactionary populism, which has long laid dormant, but has been unleashed since 2016. It threatens to abandon all prudence and overthrow all restraint, to attack the civil service and the courts, to reject Human Rights, to corrode civic discourse, and to set aside all procedural propriety, until we end up sodden in the gutter of despotism. On the one hand, a persistent constitutional conservatism stands in the way of the necessary, long overdue, reforms which would breathe life and vitality back into an old, tired, country, and would give our institutions the strength to resist such destructive forces.  

Nations, like people, can experience decisive moments of what might be termed repentance. When they wake up in the gutter – their capital city bombed, their army disbanded, their people starving – they can turn from the paths which took them to that place, and find a newness of life, a new hope, embodied in a new constitutional order. This is what Germany, Italy and Japan did after 1945. They can also experience a kind of conversion, away from false principles to truer ones, as much of Central Europe did after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  

I am using theological language here to describe merely civic and political attitudes, which is always a dangerous thing to do. It would be a misreading of my intent if one were to conclude that I conflate a well-ordered polity with the Heavenly City. Nevertheless, a well-constituted polity, in which freedom and justice, peace and the common good, are not only treasured but actually – to some practical extent – achieved, is an inestimable blessing. We should strive to obtain it.  

A well-constituted polity is based upon the principle of ‘public government’. The state is a public entity, belonging to the public, in which public office is a public trust to be used for public ends, and where citizens in public life must be faithful stewards of the public good, for which they are responsible to the public. 

Democracy is our shorthand term for this arrangement, although it is a rather clumsy one. Democracy, properly understood, is not unlimited majority rule, nor the unconstrained rule of the person elected by the majority. It is, rather, a complex political system that combines representative and responsible government with civil liberties and the rule of law.  

Populism is a caricature of democracy. Populists attempt to undermine the barriers that restrain abuses of power. Their attempts to weaken the judiciary and civil service, sideline those who disagree with them, infringe fundamental rights, centralise power, and restrict public dissent, must therefore be seen as attacks on democracy. They put arbitrary power into the hands of particular persons. 

England’s position is not that of Germany in 1945. It might, in some ways, be analogous to that of Central Europe in the 1990s. Much of England today looks like I remember my first visit there then: the same grey faces, the same cheap clothes, the same visible effects of bad housing, bad food, and lack of opportunity. If anything, England is worse off, because at least those countries had hope of better days ahead. No one yet has imagined an English future better than its past.  

England has been let down by a failed ideology – that of neoliberal capitalism, which, as Dr Abby Innes points out, is every bit as rigid and doctrinaire as the official Marxist ideology of the former Communist states. England has been let down, too, by decades of corrupt, incompetent, short-sighted and careless government. The symptoms of misgovernment can be seen in England’s economic record, its social problems, its crumbling infrastructure and over-stretched public services.  Outside the Customs Union and the Single Market, England is isolated from its European neighbours.  The country is not living up to its potential.  

This should spur us to consider the weakness of English democracy. As currently established, the state often fails to serve the common good. The English do not live in a well-constituted polity with ‘public government’ as its foundation, but in a fiefdom-state that has been cut, privatised, deregulated into near oblivion.  

If it were only a matter of specific individuals, or of one party, the problem could easily be fixed. But the country has not only been let down by this government or that government, by this party or that Prime Minister. It is the system of government, the constitutional order as a whole, that has failed us. 

Restoring England’s hope for the future, its prosperity, and its quality of life, must begin, then, with the improvement of English democracy, and that with a refoundation of its constitution. This is hard to hear, because, as Mr Podsnap put it in Charles’ Dickens 1864 novel Our Mutual Friend, ‘We Englishmen are very proud of our constitution, Sir. It was bestowed upon us by Providence. No other country is so favoured as this country.' It is hard to admit that something is broken, when once it was so highly prized – indeed, so intrinsically bound up in England’s sense of national identity. 

The Westminster Model of democracy is not without its virtues. Its origins can be traced far back into English history. Yet it did not develop into maturity in England alone. Bagehot was carried around the world, read under palm and pine, and drilled into the ruling classes from Vancouver to Colombo. The Westminster Model owes much to Magna Carta and Simon de Montfort’s ‘Model Parliament’ of 1295, but it owes just as much to the developments of the Victorian age: (nearly) universal suffrage, political parties, manifestos, and the establishment of a permanent, professional and non-partisan civil service.  

The transformation of Empire to Commonwealth ended British rule, but not the British way of ruling. Westminster Model democracy had to be set down, of course, into a written, supreme-and-fundamental law, through which all the essentials were faithfully reproduced. If you want to discover the Westminster Model of democracy at its peak, read the constitutions of Belize or the Solomon Islands.

The rejection of written constitutions has been a prevailing English conservative principle since Burke. However, it leaves us defenceless against authoritarian reactionary populism. 

The irony is that those who are most comfortable with the imperial legacy are also those who are doing most to destroy public government at home. While fetishizing ‘The British Constitution’ and ‘Our Eight Hundred Years of Unbroken History’, the populist right rejects the principles and the values upon which that achievement rested. Just as they seek to create a pastiche of 1950s Britishness (absent of strong workers’ rights, strong unions, a generous welfare state, and publicly owned utilities and services), so likewise they seek to create a pastiche of the 1950s British Constitution, without the self-restraint, moderation, decorum, public service ethos, and high levels of social trust and cohesion, which made that system of complex unwritten rules work.  

The Blair-Brown reforms of 1997-2010 are a particular target of reactionary ire. The Human Rights Act mitigated, although it did not remove, the absolutism of Parliament. It gave the people who have little voice under a purely majoritarian system – ‘the weird, the wicked, the weak’ – a means by which to challenge the exercise of power. Devolution broke the prevailing English notion of British uniformity: it not only allowed Scotland and Wales to have a (muted) political voice and some (tightly constrained) freedom to craft their own policies, but also forced England into a reckoning with its own national identity. So far, this has played out mostly through the doubling-down on what the former Labour MP and scholar of English identity John Denham calls ‘Anglo-centric British nationalism’. The Tory – and Reform UK – constitutional agenda is obsessed with restoring the unlimited power of Parliament and of reinforcing the Anglo-centric British state. 

As we can see, from every NHS waiting list to every pothole in the road, the Anglo-British state is no longer working very well. It has all the vices of its past, and few of its virtues. A return to the pre-1997 status quo ante is impossible – it would be like trying to retake Hong Kong. Parliamentary absolutism tempered by the ‘good chaps’ theory is no longer a viable option. Either we must accept an untampered absolutism – which is the agenda of the reactionary populist right – or else we must deepen constitutional reform, and arrive at a new constitutional settlement which accepts that the British Imperial state, oriented to the needs of maritime imperial commerce, is over, and that an English nation-state, oriented to the common good of the ordinary people of England, is now needed.  

This entails a new, democratic, constitutional foundation. Small-c conservatives might baulk at this. The rejection of written constitutions has been a prevailing English conservative principle since Burke. However, it leaves us defenceless against authoritarian reactionary populism. Moderate, sensible, responsible conservatives should learn to think differently about written constitutions. Paradoxically, constitutionalism strengthens the state. By bounding and limiting state power, and providing a robust system of responsibility, accountability, and restraint, constitutional government actually enables the state to draw upon a deeper well of public legitimacy.  

What would English identity look like, if it were forged between the Channel and the Tweed, and not between the Nile and the Irrawaddy? What might an English constitution look like, and what values and principles might inform it?  

A constitution for England must recognise that England is a society of many faiths and none. It is, however, an acknowledgment that Christianity has forged and formed not only our institutions, but also our understandings of right and wrong. 

In addressing the last of these questions, the Christian tradition has much to add to the conversation.  

Christian theologians and political philosophers have spilled a lot of ink, in the past two millennia, on questions of good government, on the relationship between church and state, and what it means to be a Christian and a citizen of an earthly state.  

There seems to be an assumption – amongst both supporters and opponents of written constitutions – that a written constitution would have to be based on secular values. This stems, in part, from our ignorance of our own Westminster Model constitutional tradition. The constitutions of the United States and of France might be strictly secular, but the constitution of Antigua and Barbuda claims to be ‘founded upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy of God’, while that of Tuvalu explicitly refers to ‘respect for Christian principles’.  

This is not a bid for theocracy. A constitution for England must recognise that England is a society of many faiths and none. It is, however, an acknowledgment that Christianity has forged and formed not only our institutions, but also our understandings of right and wrong. To give all that up would produce an ethical vacuum in society, which will be filled only with ever more grotesque forms of exploitation.  

The cardinal ethical principle of constitutional democracy is a recognition of human dignity. At the origin and foundation of all institutions, and laws, and norms, we find ourselves having to cling to the fundamental command that Christians call the Golden Rule: ‘Do unto others as you would have others do unto you’. If we abandon that principle of human dignity, there is no solid ground on which to build a decent, well-ordered, democratic polity. Perhaps then we can build a new ‘Jerusalem’ in England’s grey and drizzly land. 

Join with us - Behind the Seen

Seen & Unseen is free for everyone and is made possible through the generosity of our amazing community of supporters.

If you’re enjoying Seen & Unseen, would you consider making a gift towards our work?

Alongside other benefits (book discounts etc.), you’ll receive an extra fortnightly email from me sharing what I’m reading and my reflections on the ideas that are shaping our times.

Graham Tomlin

Editor-in-Chief