Article
Comment
Grenfell disaster
Trauma
6 min read

Grenfell: how long should we remember?

There are good and bad ways of remembering.

Graham is the Director of the Centre for Cultural Witness and a former Bishop of Kensington.

A white building wrap around a tower is topped by a green heart and the slogan: Grenfell Always In Our Heaets.
Grenfell Tower, Summer 2024.
Rc1959, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons.

For nearly eight years now, Grenfell Tower has remained standing as a reminder of one of the most painful days in recent British history. The news that the government intends to dismantle the remains of the Tower has split local opinion. Some of the bereaved and survivors suggest that the government has scarcely consulted them. For many, the building is a tomb, still containing the memory, if not the actual remains of their loved ones whose bodies could not be recovered. They understandably fear them being forgotten when the building no longer stands as a reminder. Last year I sat in on a gathering where bereaved families and survivors of the fire told their stories in the hearing of representatives of the companies who were responsible for the cladding which caused the fire to spread. The memories and emotions are still raw and unhealed.  

On the other hand, many local residents would like it taken away, as its constant, looming presence is a painful reminder of that dark night. They also see the logic in bringing down a fatally damaged and increasingly dangerous structure that costs the taxpayer millions each year to keep from collapsing under its own weight.  

The key issue at the heart of this debate is how we remember - especially, how we remember pain. In the rhetoric around Grenfell, as with many other tragedies, we often hear calls to ‘always remember’ and that we must ‘never forget’ the wrongs done which caused the deaths of those 72 people. The Grenfell Memorial Commission, which was charged with thinking about what memorial should stand on the site of the building in future, claimed as its aim to “make sure the Grenfell tragedy can never be forgotten.” 

Such calls to ‘never forget’ are powerful. They seem a proper tribute to those who died, they ensure that those culpable are not let off too easily, and that justice is properly done. To blithely forget such horrendous evils seems an affront to justice, and a morally culpable act. 

Yet must we always remember the hurts and pains of the past? Can we imagine a future where such memories fade into the distance and no longer cast their painful shadow over our lives?  

Whether and when Grenfell Tower comes down, is yet to be determined. Yet only when we keep in mind the destination of the journey of healing can we make good decisions...

Theologian Miroslav Volf asks all these questions in his book The End of Memory. He describes good and bad ways of remembering. We can remember to cherish the dead, to learn lessons for the future, to ensure justice is done. Yet we can also remember to nurse grievances, to cling onto grudges, to imagine horrible pain inflicted on those who wronged us. Memories of wrongs done to us can imprison and define us purely as victims, never in control, always subject to the actions for others, with no agency of our own. 

Volf’s Christian faith tells him that the human race is beckoned towards a new world, in the full presence of God, of what he calls ‘final reconciliation’. It is a place where we will be captivated by a vision of the beauty and goodness of God, a vision that we only dimly glimpse in this world. He asks the question: in such a world, will we remember all the wrongs done to us? Can we imagine still clinging onto the memory of the sins and crimes that others inflicted on us? Even if that were in principle possible, would we remember all the harm done to us? And the harm we did to others? If not, which sins would we remember? Which ones would we forget? Would not such memories blight the joy that such a world would surely offer? 

Reflecting on his own youthful and painful memories of interrogation in communist Yugoslavia, and other tragedies such as the 9/11attacks, Volf imagines getting to the point where we don't forget the terrible things that others have done to us, but when we actively don't remember them. They still occupy a place in our minds but are instead relegated to a corner of our consciousness, under our control, no longer rearing their ugly and painful heads when triggered by other events. Such an ability not to remember, he suggests, is a good thing: 

 "Non-remembrance of wrongs suffered is the gift God will give to those who have been wronged."  

At the same time, Volf is careful not to imagine getting to this point too easily. Wrongdoers cannot for a moment insist that those they have wronged forget their misdeeds. Such non-remembrance can only happen when truth has been told, sins punished, and justice done. Yet when all that has taken place, that ‘final reconciliation’, Volf imagines, might even embrace the unimaginable - an ultimate reconciliation between the wronged and the wrongdoers.  

Is it possible to imagine children whose parents were killed because of the negligence and culpable cheating of contractors who knowingly put unsafe cladding on Grenfell Tower, ever being reconciled to and even embracing the perpetrators? Volf suggests we can, while recognising that this can only happen when the crime has been identified, fully recognised, repented of profoundly, forgiveness offered and accepted and the appropriate penalty paid.  

While such a process remains incomplete, the obligation to remember remains, and reconciliation cannot yet take place. But true healing from such hurts is not to be forever dominated by them, defined by them, or to live in constant enmity and resentment because of them. It is, instead, to gain the strength and ability not to remember them, not to be defined by them, and even - possibly, perhaps - to find reconciliation with their perpetrators. 

The Grenfell Public Inquiry that reported last year was an important step for the bereaved and survivors. It was not the end of the journey. Far from it. The process of enacting justice through prosecution of the guilty lies ahead. But as an exercise in truth-telling, in giving perpetrators the opportunity to own up and confess their guilt, in a truthful recognition of what went wrong, it was a vital step towards the possibility of reaching that stage when the memory of Grenfell no longer defines its victims. It opens up the possibility at some point in the future, where they might be in control of their memories rather than their memories controlling them. 

The Danish Christian philosopher Søren Kierkegaard once wrote that we humans need to learn both “the art of forgetting” and “the art of remembering”. To know when and how to do one and when to do the other is the gift of God and an art of true wisdom. 

Whether and when Grenfell Tower comes down, is yet to be determined. Yet only when we keep in mind the destination of the journey of healing can we make good decisions about such fraught and emotionally charged issues. The Tower cannot remain as it is - everyone acknowledges that . Yet it's hard for many to think about its disappearance without knowing what will replace it. Which is why plans to demolish the Tower must go hand in hand with the plans for the lasting Memorial that will stand on the site. Yet that can only happen if it serves the goal of being able truthfully to remember no longer the pain and injustice of the past.  

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Article
Assisted dying
Comment
Freedom of Belief
Politics
5 min read

Holding an opposing view is not 'imposing' belief on the assisted dying debate

Opposing interventions from believers on dishonesty grounds is a sinister development in public debate

Nick is an author and Senior Fellow at Theos,a think tank.

A graphic shows a gallery of people with religious symbols on their clothing.

“There are some who oppose this crucial reform,” Esther Rantzen wrote recently of MPs who dared to opposed Kim Leadbeater’s Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life private member’s bill. “Many of them have undeclared personal religious beliefs…  [do] they have the right to impose them on patients like me, who do not share them?” 

This is a peculiarly common argument for those who support the right to Assisted Dying, which is surprising as it would be hard to come up with a less coherent case against religion in public life. The idea that elected MPs engaged in parliamentary debate are “imposing” their will on other people is odd. The idea that MPs have undeclared personal religious beliefs is strange too. I think it’s fair to say that most people know that Shabana Mahmood is a Muslim or Tim Farron is a Christian, and for those that don’t know that but do have access to Google, it takes less than five seconds to find out the religious beliefs of an MP. 

Perhaps most tellingly, however, why is it that we should be alert to – read wary of – MPs religious beliefs? Do the non-religious not have beliefs of which we should be cognizant? If my MP is motivated by a philosophy of relentless, Peter Singer-like utilitarianism or vague, incoherent secular humanism I’d like to know. 

In truth, Rantzen’s intervention in this debate, like that of a number of others – Lord Falconer, Simon Jenkins, Humanists UK, etc. – is part of a recent and rather dispiriting attempt to de facto exclude religious contribution to public debates by accusing them of being dishonest. 

To be clear, secular voices have long tried to exclude religious ones, but the tactics change. Back in the New Atheist heyday of the early twenty first century, all you needed to do was splutter something about sky fairies or Bronze Age beliefs or mind viruses to close down any sort of religious intervention. If, as Richard Dawkins famously put it, faith was one of the world’s great evils, comparable to the smallpox virus only harder to eradicate, no sensible parliament could possibly want to heed what faith had to say. 

Even back then, however, there were subtler arguments against faith, which usually came in the form of semi-digested Rawslian political liberalism, and demanded the religious participation in public debate had to obey the strictures of “public reasoning”, using logic and language that “all reasonable people” will understand. 

There are quite a few holes in this particular away of thinking (who are “reasonable people” anyway?) but as a rule of thumb, it’s not a bad one to follow. It is quite right and proper, if only as a matter of pragmatism, to speak in terms that your opponents will get, just as it is right and proper, as a matter of courtesy, to be open about what ultimately motivates you. 

And so that is what religious figures – MPs, leaders, institutions – do. Having read through pretty much all their contributions to the assisted dying debate, in parliament and beyond, I can testify that not many people, on either side of the debate, quote scripture or invoke papal teaching as a way of persuading, let alone commanding, others. (As it happens, parliamentarians haven’t really done that since the 1650s, but that’s another story).  

Rather, they argue in terms of policy and principles. They talk about the risk of legislative slippage, of changing attitudes to the vulnerable, of the need for better palliative care, of existing pressures on the NHS, etc. This is quite right and proper. As James Cleverly remarked in the Common debate in November, “We are speaking about the specifics of this Bill: this is not a general debate or a theoretical discussion, but about the specifics of the Bill”. And so that is what they did. 

Does anyone seriously think it is a good idea to compel a believing Jew to stand up in parliament and declare her faith before she were allowed to speak? 

In effect, religious public figures, whether or not their beliefs are “declared”, do what they have (rightly) been asked to do by those who have appointed themselves as gatekeepers for our public debate. And so this has forced the usual suspects to pivot in their argument. No longer able to dismiss religious contributions for what they say (“don’t quote the Bible at me!”) they are now compelled to dismiss them for what they don’t say. Hence, the trope that has become popular among such campaigners – “you are not being honest about your real motivations”. 

A new report from the think tank Theos, entitled, How much have your religious views influenced your decision?”: religion and the assisted dying debate, unpacks the various objections that have been levelled at the religious contribution to the debate, and then systematically dismantles them.

Some of these objections are old school in the extreme.  

Religious belief is too intellectually inadequate or disfiguring for debates of this nature. 

Religion is insufficiently willing to adapt and compromise for politics.  

Faith is ill-fitted or even inadmissible in a secular polity or culture.  

But the report majors on the newer objection, so clearly displayed by Esther Rantzen, what we might call “dishonesty” objection, that religious contributors are fundamentally dishonest about their motivations and objectives. 

In truth, this is no stronger than the more tried and tested objections, and it displays a serious, possibly intentional, misunderstanding of what a religious argument actually is. To quote the political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, such secular campaigners “present it as a crude prescription from God, backed up with threat of hellfire, derived from general or particular revelation, and they contrast it with the elegant simplicity of a philosophical argument by Rawls (say) or Dworkin [and] with this image in mind, they think it obvious that religious argument should be excluded from public life.” 

Contemporary arguments against religion in public life are slightly more sophisticated than Waldron’s caricature here, but not much. The idea that religio should be “declared” as a competing interest, so as to stop religious participants in debate from being “dishonest” is every bit as sinister, against both the letter and the spirit of plural, liberal democracy. Does anyone seriously think it is a good idea to compel a believing Jew to stand up in parliament and declare her faith before she were allowed to speak?  

As the assisted dying debate returns to parliament for the final push, there will be much animated debate. That is quite right and proper. A democracy needs vigorous and honest argument. But part of that honesty involves opening the doors of debate to everyone, and not subtly trying to exclude those with whom you disagree on the spurious grounds that they are being dishonest.

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