Article
Assisted dying
Comment
Politics
7 min read

Assisted dying hasn’t resolved Swiss end of life debates

Despite attempts to normalise it, new challenges still arise.

Markus is Professor of Moral Theology and Ethics at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

A single bed, wiith an unmade colourful duvet stands in the corner of a room. A hoist reaches over it from the corner.
The dying room, Dignitas Clinic, Zurich.
Dignitas.

While countries such as Germany, France or the UK are currently struggling to find a suitable regulation for assisted suicide, their peers in the Netherlands, Canada and Switzerland have years of experience with the controversial medical practice. Even if each state must explore its own ways of dealing with these ethically controversial issues, it is obvious that international experience should not be ignored as they try to find a way forward.  

In Switzerland the discussions and challenges surrounding assisted suicide are increasing rather than decreasing. Contrary to the idea that a liberalisation of assisted suicide would lead to fewer debate, tensions and difficulties are increasing.  My observation, and thesis, indicates that practices such as assisted suicide cannot be “normalised”, even in the medium and long term. 

Developments 

In recent years, one to two per cent of all deaths in Switzerland were due to assisted suicide.  From an overall perspective, this practice is therefore still a marginal phenomenon. However, a look at the total number of assisted suicides per year gives a different impression, as this has increased more than fivefold in the years between 2008 and 2020, from an initial 253 to 1,251 deaths per year, a rising trend. The cause of death statistics for Switzerland only include those cases of assisted suicide in which persons resident in Switzerland were involved and the death was reported to the authorities. According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, in 2020, it was mainly people over the age of 64 who made use of assisted suicide. Detailed information on the underlying illnesses of the people affected in 2018 shows that about 40 per cent were affected by cancer, just under 12 per cent by diseases of the nervous system, a further 12 per cent by cardiovascular diseases and just over a third by other illnesses, including dementia and depression. There are currently seven right-to-die organisations in Switzerland which play a leading role in a typical assisted suicide procedure. They work closely with doctors who are prepared to prescribe a lethal drug, generally Pentobarbital. The data reflects an ambivalent picture: on the one hand, the proportion of assisted suicide cases is relatively low in relation to all deaths and, for example, in comparison to the large number of people who die in Switzerland in a state of deep sedation until death; on the other hand, the number of assisted suicides in Switzerland has risen sharply in recent years.  

Perceptions and assessments 

Since the 1990s, the public perception and assessment of assisted suicide in Swiss society has changed from an initially cautious and sceptical attitude towards broad acceptance. While the debates in other countries are characterised by relatively sharp controversies between those in favour and those against, public discourse in Switzerland has been less polarised. There are indications of a certain normalisation of the situation, the strongest sign is that Switzerland has so far refrained from regulating assisted suicide in a separate law. The results of a recently-published study on the opinions of Swiss people over the age of 55 regarding assisted suicide confirm these impressions.: The survey showed that over four-fifths of respondents support legal assisted suicide, almost two-thirds can imagine asking for assisted suicide themselves at some point, and that almost one-third are considering becoming members of an right-to-die organisation in the near future, with one-twentieth of respondents already being members at the time of the survey in 2015. Among people with a higher level of education and older people aged between 65 and 74, approval of assisted suicide and corresponding practices was higher than among less educated, younger and very old people; approval was also significantly lower among religious practitioners. 

Sensitive topics  

The fact that assisted suicide enjoys broad support in Swiss society as a whole does not mean that there are not difficult and controversial aspects relating to its practice. Relevant topics include, in particular, places of death, authorisation criteria and procedures. 

Places of death: Assisted suicide is permitted also for mentally ill persons in psychiatric clinics, but the federal court recommends great caution here and requires two psychiatric expert opinions to ensure that the person willing to die is capable of judgement with regard to the desire to commit suicide. Although assisted suicide for children and adolescents has hardly been an issue in Switzerland to date, the corresponding debates are currently being held in Canada and elsewhere. The question of whether people in prison also have a right to make use of assisted suicide, has been the subject of intense debate in Switzerland for years, with a generally positive response. The question of whether right-to-die organisations should be given access to acute hospitals and nursing homes is still the subject of controversial debate, with regulations varying from hospital to hospital, nursing home to nursing home 

Authorisation criteria: With regard to the admission criteria for persons willing to die, the capacity for judgement is at the centre of attention: while the importance of the criterion is undisputed in itself, there is a struggle for reliable standards and procedures to reliably test this criterion. Since the publication of the SAMS ethical guidelines Management of Dying and Death in 2018, the criterion for end of life and, depending on this, that of unbearable suffering have received new attention due to an objection by the Swiss Medical AssociationFMH. While the guidelines are based on the criterion of unbearable suffering, the FMH wants to stick to the near end of life. It is certainly difficult to diagnose the existence of unbearable suffering, as the international debate on the significance and assessment of existential (neither physical nor psychological) suffering shows. This difficulty is illustrated by the debate that has been going on for several years in Switzerland about so-called old-age suicide and the inherent criterion of tiredness of life. At the centre of the dispute is the legally difficult question of whether a doctor is also allowed to prescribe a lethal drug to a healthy person. 

Procedures: Here the role of the medical profession and right to die organisations is by far the most important issue. In contrast to the physician-centred models in Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, the Swiss model of assisted suicide is based on the idea that every person has the right to end their life and may call on the help of any other person to do so. Although the medical profession is usually involved in the process, the management of the procedure is normally the responsibility of a right-to-die organisation. This division of responsibilities is always up for debate when legal regulations are being considered, in which doctors should tend to take the lead in the process due to their professional background. There is also a debate about how and by whom compliance with the authorisation criteria should or could be monitored, whereby it remains to be decided whether this should be carried out before or after the death. At present, a certain amount of monitoring takes place following a suicide, insofar as the authorities investigate the cases afterwards. There is also debate as to whether Pentobarbital is a suitable means of suicide, especially if this barbiturate is not administered intravenously but taken orally; there is no knowledge of how many cases are currently administered intravenously and by whom an infusion is then set up. Last but not least, consideration has already been given to the use of lethal drugs, such as helium gas, which can be obtained over the counter. 

Attempts at regulation 

Political efforts to regulate assisted suicide in Switzerland in a more nuanced way than today have been made since the 1990s but have remain largely without consequences to date. In relevant judgements by the Federal Supreme Court or in statements by the Federal Department of Justice and Police, reference is regularly made to the ethical guidelines of the SAMS. These are classified as soft law and are therefore not legally binding, even though their content has become the subject of dispute. The National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics (NCE) had already recommended more far-reaching legal regulation in 2005 as part of a detailed opinion on the subject; in the opinion of the NCE at the time, the review of authorisation criteria, a justifiable regulation of assisted suicide for the mentally ill, children and adolescents and state supervision of right-to-die organisations, should be ensured by law. The question is what form a legal regulation can take that grants the medical profession far-reaching powers but at the same time prevents medical paternalism (in favour of or against assisted suicide). From the perspective of Swiss experience, this is “a square circle”: either the doctors retain the final decision on who receives the barbiturate, or official access rules are established, the review of which does not generally require medical expertise. 

The outlook

In the short and medium term, it can be assumed that the number of assisted suicides in Switzerland will continue to rise. The coronavirus pandemic and the particular difficulties faced by nursing homes during this time are likely to exacerbate this increase. In view of these expectations and the legislative processes in other European countries, pressure is likely to increase in Switzerland to create a legal regulation. Overall, I think politically it will be important to create a legal regulation, in order to ensure legal equality and legal certainty on the one hand and prevention of abuse and expansion on the other. At the centre of social-ethical reflection is the challenge of learning to deal with the pluralism of different ideas of a good death and to develop and establish alternative models to medically assisted dying. The thesis I mentioned at the beginning is confirmed today: assisted suicide in Switzerland can hardly be normalised; new problems, challenges and demands are constantly arising. Suicide, whether with or without the help of another person, always means an existential transgression that defies normalisation. 

Article
Assisted dying
Comment
Justice
5 min read

Will clinicians and carers objecting to assisted death be treated as nuisances?

The risk and mental cost of forcing someone to act against their conscience.
A tired-looking doctor sits at a desk dealing with paperwork.
Francisco Venâncio on Unsplash.

After a formal introduction to the House of Commons next Wednesday, MP’s will debate a draft Bill to change UK legislation on Assisted Dying. Previously, a draft Bill was introduced in the Scottish Parliament in March 2024, and is currently at committee stage. Meanwhile, in the House of Lords, a Private Member’s Bill was introduced by Lord Falconer in July and currently awaits its second reading. These draft Bills, though likely to be dropped and superseded by the Commons Bill in the fullness of time, give an early indication of what provision might be made on behalf of clinicians and other healthcare workers who wish to recuse themselves from carrying out a patient’s end of life wishes on grounds of Conscientious Objection.  

There are various reasons why someone might want to conscientiously object. The most commonly cited are faith or religious commitments. This is not to say that all people of faith are against a change in the law – there are some high-profile religious advocates for the legalisation of Assisted Dying, including both Rabbi Dr Jonathan Romain and Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury. Even so, there will be many adherents to various faith traditions who find themselves unable to take part in hastening the end of someone’s life because they feel it conflicts with their views on God and what it means to be human. 

However, there are also Conscientious Objectors who are not religious, or not formally so. Some people, perhaps many, simply feel unsure of the rights and wrongs of the matter. The coming debates will no doubt feature discussion of how changing the law for those who are terminally ill in the Netherlands and Canada has to lead to subsequent changes in the law to include those who are not terminally, but instead chronically ill. The widening of the eligibility criteria has reached a point where, in the Netherlands, one in every 20 people now ends their life by euthanasia. This troubling statistic includes many who are neurodivergent, who suffer from depression or are disabled. It is reasonable that, even if a Conscientious Objector does not adhere to a particular religion, they can be allowed to object if they feel uneasy about the social message that Assisted Dying seems to send to vulnerable people.  

“You will often find that legislation that provides a right to conscientious objection is interpreted by judges these days in a way that seems to treat conscientious objectors as nuisances” 

Mehmet Ciftci

  Conscientious Objection clauses can themselves send a social message. A response to the Scottish Bill produced by the Law Society of Scotland notes concern over the wording of the Conscientious Objection clause, as it appears to be more prescriptive in the draft Bill than in previous Acts such as the Abortion Act of 1967. In the case of any legal proceedings that arise from a clinician’s refusal to cooperate, the current wording places the burden of proof onto the Conscientious Objector, stating (at 18.2):  

In any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection is to rest on the person claiming to rely on it.  

The Bill provides no indication of what is admissible as ‘proof’. Evidence of membership of a Church, Synagogue, Mosque or similar might be the obvious starting point. But where does that leave those described above, who object on grounds of personal conscience alone? How does one meaningfully evidence an inner sense of unease?  

The wording of the Private Member’s Bill, currently awaiting its second reading in the House of Lords, provides even less clarity, stating only (at 5.0): 

A person is not under any duty (whether by contract or arising from any statutory or other legal requirement) to participate in anything authorised by  this Act to which that person has a conscientious objection. 

Whilst this indicates that there is no duty to participate in assisting someone to end their life, there remains a wider duty of care that healthcare professionals cannot ignore. Thus, a general feature in the interpretation of such conscience clauses in medicine is that that the conscientious objector is under an obligation to refer the case to a professional who does not share the same objection. This can be seen in practice looking at abortion law, where ideas around conscientious objection are more developed and have been tried in the courts. In the case of an abortion, a clinician can refuse to take part in the procedure, but they must still find an alternative clinician who is willing to perform their role, and they must still carry out ancillary care and related administrative tasks.  

Placing such obligations onto clinicians could be seen as diminishing rather than respecting their objection. Dr Mehmet Ciftci, a Researcher at the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics and Public Life at the University of Oxford comments:  

You will often find that legislation that provides a right to conscientious objection is interpreted by judges these days in a way that seems to treat conscientious objectors as nuisances who are just preventing the efficient delivery of services. They are forced to refer patients on to those who will perform whatever procedure they are objecting to, which involves a certain cooperation or facilitation with the act. 

This touches everyone, even those who (if the Bill becomes law) will still choose to conscientiously object. Therefore, it is important to consider that the human conscience is a very real phenomenon, which means that facilitating an act that feels morally wrong can give rise to feelings of guilt or shame, even if one has not been a direct participant.  

Psychologists observe that when feelings of guilt are not addressed, if they are treated dismissively or internalised, this can significantly erode self-confidence and increase the likelihood of depressive symptoms. But even before modern psychology could speak to the effects of guilt, biblical writers already had much to say on the painful consequences of living with a troubled conscience. In the Psalms, more than one ancient poet pours out their heart to God, saying that living with guilt has caused their bones to feel weak, or their heart to feel heavy, or their world to feel desolate and lonely.   

If the Conscientious Objection clauses of the new Bill being proposed on Wednesday are not significantly more robust than those in the draft Bills proposed thus far, then perhaps that is something to which we should all conscientiously object? There is much to discuss about the potential rights and wrongs of legalising Assisted Dying, but there is much to discuss about the rights and wrongs of forcing people to act against their consciences too.