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Assisted dying
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Politics
7 min read

Assisted dying hasn’t resolved Swiss end of life debates

Despite attempts to normalise it, new challenges still arise.

Markus is Professor of Moral Theology and Ethics at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

A single bed, wiith an unmade colourful duvet stands in the corner of a room. A hoist reaches over it from the corner.
The dying room, Dignitas Clinic, Zurich.
Dignitas.

While countries such as Germany, France or the UK are currently struggling to find a suitable regulation for assisted suicide, their peers in the Netherlands, Canada and Switzerland have years of experience with the controversial medical practice. Even if each state must explore its own ways of dealing with these ethically controversial issues, it is obvious that international experience should not be ignored as they try to find a way forward.  

In Switzerland the discussions and challenges surrounding assisted suicide are increasing rather than decreasing. Contrary to the idea that a liberalisation of assisted suicide would lead to fewer debate, tensions and difficulties are increasing.  My observation, and thesis, indicates that practices such as assisted suicide cannot be “normalised”, even in the medium and long term. 

Developments 

In recent years, one to two per cent of all deaths in Switzerland were due to assisted suicide.  From an overall perspective, this practice is therefore still a marginal phenomenon. However, a look at the total number of assisted suicides per year gives a different impression, as this has increased more than fivefold in the years between 2008 and 2020, from an initial 253 to 1,251 deaths per year, a rising trend. The cause of death statistics for Switzerland only include those cases of assisted suicide in which persons resident in Switzerland were involved and the death was reported to the authorities. According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, in 2020, it was mainly people over the age of 64 who made use of assisted suicide. Detailed information on the underlying illnesses of the people affected in 2018 shows that about 40 per cent were affected by cancer, just under 12 per cent by diseases of the nervous system, a further 12 per cent by cardiovascular diseases and just over a third by other illnesses, including dementia and depression. There are currently seven right-to-die organisations in Switzerland which play a leading role in a typical assisted suicide procedure. They work closely with doctors who are prepared to prescribe a lethal drug, generally Pentobarbital. The data reflects an ambivalent picture: on the one hand, the proportion of assisted suicide cases is relatively low in relation to all deaths and, for example, in comparison to the large number of people who die in Switzerland in a state of deep sedation until death; on the other hand, the number of assisted suicides in Switzerland has risen sharply in recent years.  

Perceptions and assessments 

Since the 1990s, the public perception and assessment of assisted suicide in Swiss society has changed from an initially cautious and sceptical attitude towards broad acceptance. While the debates in other countries are characterised by relatively sharp controversies between those in favour and those against, public discourse in Switzerland has been less polarised. There are indications of a certain normalisation of the situation, the strongest sign is that Switzerland has so far refrained from regulating assisted suicide in a separate law. The results of a recently-published study on the opinions of Swiss people over the age of 55 regarding assisted suicide confirm these impressions.: The survey showed that over four-fifths of respondents support legal assisted suicide, almost two-thirds can imagine asking for assisted suicide themselves at some point, and that almost one-third are considering becoming members of an right-to-die organisation in the near future, with one-twentieth of respondents already being members at the time of the survey in 2015. Among people with a higher level of education and older people aged between 65 and 74, approval of assisted suicide and corresponding practices was higher than among less educated, younger and very old people; approval was also significantly lower among religious practitioners. 

Sensitive topics  

The fact that assisted suicide enjoys broad support in Swiss society as a whole does not mean that there are not difficult and controversial aspects relating to its practice. Relevant topics include, in particular, places of death, authorisation criteria and procedures. 

Places of death: Assisted suicide is permitted also for mentally ill persons in psychiatric clinics, but the federal court recommends great caution here and requires two psychiatric expert opinions to ensure that the person willing to die is capable of judgement with regard to the desire to commit suicide. Although assisted suicide for children and adolescents has hardly been an issue in Switzerland to date, the corresponding debates are currently being held in Canada and elsewhere. The question of whether people in prison also have a right to make use of assisted suicide, has been the subject of intense debate in Switzerland for years, with a generally positive response. The question of whether right-to-die organisations should be given access to acute hospitals and nursing homes is still the subject of controversial debate, with regulations varying from hospital to hospital, nursing home to nursing home 

Authorisation criteria: With regard to the admission criteria for persons willing to die, the capacity for judgement is at the centre of attention: while the importance of the criterion is undisputed in itself, there is a struggle for reliable standards and procedures to reliably test this criterion. Since the publication of the SAMS ethical guidelines Management of Dying and Death in 2018, the criterion for end of life and, depending on this, that of unbearable suffering have received new attention due to an objection by the Swiss Medical AssociationFMH. While the guidelines are based on the criterion of unbearable suffering, the FMH wants to stick to the near end of life. It is certainly difficult to diagnose the existence of unbearable suffering, as the international debate on the significance and assessment of existential (neither physical nor psychological) suffering shows. This difficulty is illustrated by the debate that has been going on for several years in Switzerland about so-called old-age suicide and the inherent criterion of tiredness of life. At the centre of the dispute is the legally difficult question of whether a doctor is also allowed to prescribe a lethal drug to a healthy person. 

Procedures: Here the role of the medical profession and right to die organisations is by far the most important issue. In contrast to the physician-centred models in Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, the Swiss model of assisted suicide is based on the idea that every person has the right to end their life and may call on the help of any other person to do so. Although the medical profession is usually involved in the process, the management of the procedure is normally the responsibility of a right-to-die organisation. This division of responsibilities is always up for debate when legal regulations are being considered, in which doctors should tend to take the lead in the process due to their professional background. There is also a debate about how and by whom compliance with the authorisation criteria should or could be monitored, whereby it remains to be decided whether this should be carried out before or after the death. At present, a certain amount of monitoring takes place following a suicide, insofar as the authorities investigate the cases afterwards. There is also debate as to whether Pentobarbital is a suitable means of suicide, especially if this barbiturate is not administered intravenously but taken orally; there is no knowledge of how many cases are currently administered intravenously and by whom an infusion is then set up. Last but not least, consideration has already been given to the use of lethal drugs, such as helium gas, which can be obtained over the counter. 

Attempts at regulation 

Political efforts to regulate assisted suicide in Switzerland in a more nuanced way than today have been made since the 1990s but have remain largely without consequences to date. In relevant judgements by the Federal Supreme Court or in statements by the Federal Department of Justice and Police, reference is regularly made to the ethical guidelines of the SAMS. These are classified as soft law and are therefore not legally binding, even though their content has become the subject of dispute. The National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics (NCE) had already recommended more far-reaching legal regulation in 2005 as part of a detailed opinion on the subject; in the opinion of the NCE at the time, the review of authorisation criteria, a justifiable regulation of assisted suicide for the mentally ill, children and adolescents and state supervision of right-to-die organisations, should be ensured by law. The question is what form a legal regulation can take that grants the medical profession far-reaching powers but at the same time prevents medical paternalism (in favour of or against assisted suicide). From the perspective of Swiss experience, this is “a square circle”: either the doctors retain the final decision on who receives the barbiturate, or official access rules are established, the review of which does not generally require medical expertise. 

The outlook

In the short and medium term, it can be assumed that the number of assisted suicides in Switzerland will continue to rise. The coronavirus pandemic and the particular difficulties faced by nursing homes during this time are likely to exacerbate this increase. In view of these expectations and the legislative processes in other European countries, pressure is likely to increase in Switzerland to create a legal regulation. Overall, I think politically it will be important to create a legal regulation, in order to ensure legal equality and legal certainty on the one hand and prevention of abuse and expansion on the other. At the centre of social-ethical reflection is the challenge of learning to deal with the pluralism of different ideas of a good death and to develop and establish alternative models to medically assisted dying. The thesis I mentioned at the beginning is confirmed today: assisted suicide in Switzerland can hardly be normalised; new problems, challenges and demands are constantly arising. Suicide, whether with or without the help of another person, always means an existential transgression that defies normalisation. 

Explainer
Assisted dying
Comment
9 min read

Assisted dying's language points to all our futures

Translating ‘lethal injection’ from Dutch releases the strange power of words.
A vial and syringe lie on a blue backdrop.
Markus Spiske on Unsplash.

In the coming weeks and months, MPs at Westminster will debate a draft bill which proposes a change in the law with regards to assisted dying in the UK. They will scrutinise every word of that bill. Language matters. 

Reading the coverage, with a particular interest in how such changes to the law have been operationalised in other countries, I was struck to discover that the term in Dutch for dying by means of a fatal injection of drugs is “de verlossende injectie.” This, when put through the rather clunky hands of Google translate, comes out literally as either “the redeeming injection” or “the releasing injection.” Of course, in English the term in more common parlance is “lethal injection”, which at first glance seems to carry neither of the possible Dutch meanings. But read on, and you will find out (as I did) that sometimes our words mean much more than we realise.   

Writing for Seen & Unseen readers, I explained a quirk of the brain that tricked them into thinking that the word car meant bicycle. Such is the mysterious world of neuroplasticity, but such also is the mysterious world of spoken language, where certain combinations of orally produced ‘sounds’ are designated to be ‘words’ which are assumed to be indicators of ‘meaning’. Such meanings are slippery things.  

This slipperiness has long been a preoccupation for philosophers of language. How do words come to indicate or delineate particular things? How come words can change their meanings? How is it that, if a friend tells you that they got hammered on Friday night, you instinctively know it had nothing to do with street violence or DIY? Why is it that in the eighteenth century it was a compliment to be called ‘silly’, but now it is an insult?  

Some words are so pregnant with possible meaning, they almost cease to have a meaning. What does “God” mean when you hear someone shout “Oh my God!”? Probably nothing at all, or very little. It is just a sound, surely? And yet no other sound has ever succeeded in fully replacing it. We are using the term “God”, as theologian Rowan Williams points out in his book The Edge of Words, as a “one-word folk poem” to refer to whatever we feel is out of our control.     

Both of these first two interpretations look at death, in some sense, ‘from the other side’ – evaluating the end of someone’s life in terms of speculation over what will happen next. 

This idea of an injection being verlossende seems to me to be the opposite. I find myself hearing it in four different (and not mutually exclusive) ways, each to do with taking control of this very uncertain question of dying. The first, releasing, sounds to me like an echo of the neo-platonic ideas that still infuse public consciousness about what it means to be dead. As we slimily carve our pumpkins for Halloween and the children clamour to cut eyeholes into perfectly good bedsheets, we see a demonstration of society’s latent belief that humans are made up of body and soul, and that at death the soul somehow leaves the body and floats into some unknown realm (or else remains, disembodied yet haunting). If we translate verlossende as releasing then we capture that idea – that of the soul, which longs to be at peace, trapped inside suffering, mortal flesh. 

Google’s second suggestion for verlossende was redeeming. This could be heard theologically. Christians believe in eternal life, that the death of this earthly body is only the start of something new – a life where there will be no crying or pain, and people will live forever in the glorious presence of God. In the bible, the apostle Paul encourages those who follow Christ to trust that they have been marked with a ‘seal’, meaning that they are like goods which have been purchased for a price, and that God will ‘redeem’ this purchase at the appointed time. Death, therefore, is not a fearful entering into the unknown, but a faithful entering into God’s promises.  

Both of these first two interpretations look at death, in some sense, ‘from the other side’ – evaluating the end of someone’s life in terms of speculation over what will happen next. But there is the view from this ‘side’ also. We do not need to speculate about what death means for some of those who experience acute suffering due to terminal illness, and who wish to hasten the end of their lives because of it. They too might want to speak of a releasing injection or a redeeming injection – given that both terms hint at the metaphor of life as a prison sentence. To be in prison is to have one’s rights and freedoms severely limited or entirely taken away. It is not uncommon to hear a sufferer refer to incapacitating illness as being ‘like a prison sentence’, and one can empathise with the desire to have the release date set, back within the sufferer’s control.  

This is the strange power and pregnancy of words – verlossende is able to carry all these meanings or none of them. Until I began researching this article, I had always assumed that the English term, lethal injection, simply meant an injection of some substance that is deadly. This is how the term is commonly understood, therefore, in a sense, this is its meaning. Yet, when I came to consider the possible origins of the word, I realised its likely etymology is from the Greek word lēthē, meaning ‘to forget’. In the Middle Ages, if something was lethal it caused not just death, but spiritual death, placing one beyond the prospect of everlasting life. By contrast, something could be fatal, meaning only that it brought one to one’s destiny or fate.  

With this in mind, as we try to speak clearly in the assisted dying debate, the term fatal injection might be a more precise way to describe this pathway to death that is in want of a name. After all, whether you believe in an afterlife or not, dying is everybody’s fate, and I can see that choosing to take control of one’s fate is, for anyone, an act of faith with regards to what comes next.  

  

This article was part-inspired by Theo Boer’s original article Euthanasia of young psychiatric patients cannot be carried out carefully enough, in Dutch newspaper Nederlands Dagblad.  Theo is a professor of health ethics at the Protestant Theology University, Utrecht. 

Read the original article in Dutch or an English translation below. Reproduced by permission.

 

 

Euthanasia of young psychiatric patients cannot be carried out carefully enough 

Theo Boer 

How is it possible to determine that patients who have suffered from psychiatric disorders for five or ten years and who are between the ages of 17 and 30 have ‘completed their treatment options’, wonders Theo Boer. It also conflicts with perhaps the most important task of psychiatrists: ‘offering hope.’  

The patients we are talking about now are not physically ill and therefore do not have the ‘comfort’ of an impending natural death. 

A letter was recently leaked in which leading psychiatrists ask the Public Prosecution Service to investigate the course of events surrounding euthanasia of young psychiatric patients.  

One death mentioned by name concerns seventeen-year-old Milou Verhoof, who received the redeeming injection from psychiatrist Menno Oosterhoff at the end of 2023. It will not have escaped many people's attention how much publicity the topic has received in the past year or so. Together with a colleague and a patient (who later also received euthanasia), Oosterhoff wrote the book Let me go.  

The tenor was: it is good that euthanasia is possible for this group of patients, the taboo must be removed, their suffering is often terrible, they have already had to undergo countless 'therapies' without effect - can one time be enough?  

Or would we rather have these patients end their lives in a gruesome way? And who really thinks that psychiatrists make hasty decisions when they decide to comply with a euthanasia request?  

To be clear: we are talking about something completely different than what has been called 'traditional euthanasia' for years: euthanasia for physically ill patients with a life expectancy of weeks or months. Given the excellent palliative care that has become available, such euthanasia will actually be less and less necessary in 2024.  

Panic  

No, the patients we are talking about now are panicky, anxious, confused, depressed, lonely, often unemployed, poorly housed, without prospects. But they are not physically ill and therefore do not have the 'comfort' of an impending natural death.  

I have heard several of them say: if only I were terminal, then euthanasia would not be necessary. The fact that there is now attention for this group of patients, with whom we in our hurried and solution-oriented society know so little how to deal, is a gain. At the same time, I am happy with the leaked letter. You can criticize Oosterhoff's procedural approach ('why not an ethical discussion instead of a legal one?'), the lack of collegiality, this perhaps underhanded action ('why did you go straight to the Public Prosecution Service?'). But in my opinion, the letter writers are definitely hitting the mark with this crooked stick. Firstly: how is it possible to determine that patients who have suffered from psychiatric disorders for five or ten years and who are between the ages of 17 and 30 have ‘completed their treatment options’ (a criterion from the Euthanasia Act)?  

Review Committee  

Nobody disputes that their suffering is unbearable. At the same time, I know from my time on a Regional Euthanasia Review Committee that an illness becomes unbearable when all hope is gone.  

A psychiatrist who gives euthanasia to a young adult is also undeniably sending the signal that, like his patient, he has given up all hope of improvement. That is actually risky, because even patients who have suffered for years sometimes recover and, moreover, our brains are not fully developed until we are 25. But it also conflicts with perhaps the most important task of psychiatrists: offering hope. In their training, the risk of transference-counter-transference is consistently pointed out: a patient takes his therapist with him into despair, the psychiatrist transfers those feelings to this and other patients: ‘this kind of suffering is untreatable and cannot be lived with’.  

In the recent NPO television documentary A Good Death we see an embrace between a psychiatrist and her emotional patient. In doing so, this psychiatrist offers a unique form of involvement. But does she provide sufficient resistance to the cynicism, despair and negative vision of the future that is also widespread outside psychiatry?  

Sensible decisions?  

That brings me to a second objection: is it sufficiently recognised how much a psychiatric illness can affect someone’s ability to make sensible decisions? The hallmark of many psychiatric illnesses is a deep desire to die and an inability to think about it in a relative way. As a result, many are unable to think in terms of a ‘possibly successful therapy’.  

Boudewijn Chabot 

The main character in the book Zelf heeft by Boudewijn Chabot, Netty Boomsma, responds to Chabot's suggestion that there might be a life after depression: 'Yes, but then I won't be it anymore.' She wants to go down with her depression. I know differences. The people with a death wish who remark about a possible therapy: ‘I hope it is not effective, because then I will have to go through it again.’ 

 Another hurdle 

If a second psychiatrist is consulted and, for example, suggests trying one or two more therapies, many patients see this as yet another hurdle on the road to euthanasia. They do not see it as a serious opportunity to be able to cope with life again. There are no easy answers here. Nor are pillories appropriate. But let euthanasia remain complicated here, and let us continue to look for hope. 

 

Reproduced by kind permission