Article
Culture
Economics
Ethics
Sustainability
9 min read

Acquisitiveness is the key modern vice

When it comes to consumption, we keep our ethics on a lead.

Joel Pierce is the administrator of Christ's College, University of Aberdeen. He has recently published his first book.

a hand hold a black payment card that reads 'buy'.
Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash.

“Sell-out!” When I arrived in Seattle around the turn of the century, I was too tardy and too scrupulously Christian to make much of what was left of the fading grunge scene. Still, I had arrived in time to fumble my way through various university dorm room arguments with more musically astute peers about when this or that band had sold out, when they abandoned the authentic homemade purity of their sound for the greater financial rewards of mainstream pop. These bands still traded on their image as rebels and outsiders, but we all knew it was a pose. Even so, we sympathised. Who wouldn’t be tempted by selling-out if the alternative was poverty and virtuous obscurity? 

I have been thinking about those conversations recently, not just because Nirvana T-shirts suddenly seem to be everywhere again, but because the other form of ambient idealism circulating in Seattle at that time, techno-utopianism, seems to have reached the end of its own version of selling out. In my decade in Seattle, I learned to scoff at those who didn’t embrace new technologies, dutifully parroting the slogan, “Information wants to be free!” The hackers of my generation had founded companies which were going to remake the corporate world. Many of my friends from university went to work for them. They were excited about building exciting new tools at lower costs, while doing it all with a social conscience. The bosses of these companies were rock stars in T-shirts and jeans, changing the world.  

Two decades later, few of us are happy with the world they’ve built. The professions threatened by their innovations started with music and journalism and have now moved on to just about anything that an AI can imitate. Many of those bosses are still in T-shirts and jeans, still pretending to be outsiders, even as their wealth has piled into unimaginable sums. Their continual need for more has led many of them to decide that a social conscience is too expensive a liability to retain. They prioritise profits and share prices above employee well-being and social cohesion. Some demur from taking stands against authoritarian politicians, pretending that such neutrality is a matter of principle and not economic self-interest. Others openly egg on our broken politics, eager to snatch still more spoils from their demise.  

What has gone wrong? As an ethicist, my temptation always is to say that if only these bosses were better advised, reminded of the responsibilities of their power, things could change. What is a skilled ethicist if not someone whose rhetoric and erudition can move the hearts of the mighty? 

There is one immovable object that all his ethical demolition work could not shift. His king had palaces to build, heretic German princes to bring to heel, and an ancestral homeland to recapture.

At the advent of European colonialism, there was perhaps no more skilled or erudite moral theologian than Francisco de Vitoria.  After taking the premiere professorship at the best university in Spain, what was becoming the richest state in Europe, he pioneered legal and ethical theories which reverberate in international and human rights law today. There were few more incisive critics of the self-deceptive rationalisations of his contemporaries and few better placed to have the ear of one of the most powerful rulers of the age, the king of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V. 

Today Vitoria is often pointed to as a prophet, someone who drew on his theological expertise and rhetorical acumen to tear apart Spanish justifications for their growing overseas empire. This reputation largely rests on his On the American Indians, a speech he gave in response to the horrific reports of “bloody massacres and of innocent individuals pillaged of their possessions and dominions” which were filtering back to Spain. In it Vitoria does indeed dismantle dozens of quasi-legal entitlements to which the Spanish appealed to justify these actions. By the time he reaches the end of the speech he even seems to be contemplating Spain abandoning the Americas. He says, “The conclusion of this whole dispute appears to be this: that if all these titles were inapplicable…the whole Indian expedition and trade would cease”.  

However, when he turns to acknowledging the financial implications of this, he allows that it “would mean a huge loss to the royal exchequer, which would be intolerable.” Here Vitoria concedes that there is one immovable object that all his ethical demolition work could not shift. His king had palaces to build, heretic German princes to bring to heel, and an ancestral homeland to recapture from the French. Money was needed for Charles to play his role as a king among kings, and no ethical quibbles about evil deeds carried out far away could be allowed to impede its flow. After this admission Vitoria sputters to a conclusion with a few unworkable and naive suggestions about how to at least make colonialism marginally less terrible.   

If there is a historical parable calculated to drive an ethicist to despair this is it. It shows ethical reflection for what it all too often is, an ineffectual expression of moral anxieties we air and then largely ignore. Our institutions, whether nation-states or companies, make a show of acting ethically, but few of us are fooled. It is a pose. The sorts of ‘ethics’ practised by countries and corporations are strictly those which aren’t a serious threat to the appetites of their leaders for more wealth, power, and security. Like Charles V, they too have peers among whom it is intolerable to contemplate losing status.  

These priorities are reflected even among those of us with less stratospheric power or wealth. Many of us worry about the origins of our food, our clothes, and our cheap electronics, having heard stories of labourers spending long hours in fields or cramped sweatshops. We may even buy Fairtrade as a response, but only if the price isn’t too high and if this ‘ethical consumption’ doesn’t mean giving up our middle-class lifestyle. 

The ‘ethics’ of our consumption are kept on a convenient lead. They are allowed to nibble around the edges of our consciences, but never to tear into the heart of the way we inhabit the world. 

In his work, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the sorts of goods we pursue can be lumped into two broad categories, goods of effectiveness and goods of excellence. The former are the things like wealth, power, and fame, which can be conferred and even sometimes transferred and which bear little relation to the characters of the people involved. The latter are the sorts of skills and performances, the virtues and virtuosities, which  people attain through long and disciplined development.  

For MacIntyre, both kinds of goods are necessary, but it matters a great deal which one gets priority. In a society which prioritises goods of effectiveness – such as Vitoria’s, but also, for MacIntyre, most modern societies as well –procedural justice reigns supreme. As long as we didn’t break any rules in getting our money and status or, for that matter, our exciting new clothes or smart speakers, we are in the clear. The problem, as Vitoria’s case demonstrates, is that in such societies even this minimal kind of justice cannot be allowed to block the flow of wealth. So procedural justice winds up being a tamed tiger in the service of the powerful. It is let out of its cage only when convenient – typically to demonise the failings of others. This is not just true of billionaires and politicians. Those of us who are western, middle-class consumers play this game too. The ‘ethics’ of our consumption are kept on a convenient lead. They are allowed to nibble around the edges of our consciences, but never to tear into the heart of the way we inhabit the world. 

What would it mean to prioritise goods of excellence? This is one of those questions MacIntyre poses, but does not answer, because he is convinced that in each society it would look different. Each community would need to begin by wrestling with what kinds of people they should be, what excellences they can and should pursue within their communities, and what virtues should be emphasised. Only then should they move on to think about what sorts of wealth or power are necessary to achieve these. Still, it can be frustrating that MacIntyre does not lay out his preferred programme. He offers no ready-made blueprint for a just society.  

Of course, neither did Jesus when he counseled his disciples to seek first the kingdom of God, telling them that if they did so the necessities of life, food, drink, and clothes, would be provided. What Jesus meant by the kingdom of God is elusive, now and not yet, hidden and revealed in parable and aphorism. What it was not, however, is clear. It was not a kingdom founded on acquiring earthly power and wealth. In fact, much of the teaching of the gospels can be boiled down to Jesus’ warning about the dangers of prioritising the goods of effectiveness (“Where your treasure is there your heart will be also”, “One thing you lack. Go sell everything you have and give to the poor”, “The rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them. Not so with you”, “Man does not live on bread alone”, “What does it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his soul?”) and urging his disciples to embrace the goods of excellence that constitute the kingdom of God.  

Understood this way, the reason it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom is that the hunger for riches, wealth, and fame pulls those enamoured with goods of effectiveness away from true fulfillment. There are always more houses to own, new neighbours to impress, and new areas to conquer. Acquisitiveness, MacIntyre reminds his readers, is the characteristic vice of modernity. That many of us, from billionaires down to underpaid academics, habitually think that what is missing from our life is a little more money or fame, is evidence that he’s right. 

For Jesus, virtuous obscurity and poverty were preferable to fame. We remember this at every nativity play when we acknowledge that the best God could manage for witnesses to the divine arrival was a hard scrabble group of animal herders and a few foreign astrologers. It is not that Jesus refused to use his abilities or hid away from public notice. However, the public he chose to act among was nestled in a corner of a corner of the empire, far from the rewards offered by the cultured salons of Roman power and privilege. In two of the gospels, Jesus is tempted to sell out. He is offered unimaginable fame and power at the outset of his ministry. He forcefully rejects it. For Jesus, an itinerant life spent ministering to fishermen and farmers was enough.  

What would it look like for us to embrace Jesus’s priorities? A place to start would be actually listening to Jesus about practices such as fasting, praying, and the almsgiving. Each of these is an act of resistance against the continual appetite for more and a testimony to an economy of grace that exists beyond all human economies. We also could try preaching in a way that takes seriously the admonitions of Jesus. I have heard numerous sermons about the rich young ruler which include an extended caveat on how maybe it was important for him to sell his possessions, but that doesn’t mean we have to. Maybe not, but shouldn’t those of us who call ourselves Christians, at least be open to God having that radical a call on our life? If our ethics and our faith are not allowed to ask these questions of us, if we have sold out in such a way that the real possibility of them radically disrupting our lives is intolerable to our imagination, what good are they? 

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Article
Community
Culture
Film & TV
Identity
5 min read

What makes us human?

We've more in common with our ancient ancestors than we might like to think

Claire Williams is a theologian investigating women’s spirituality and practice. She lecturers at Regents Theological College.

A re-enactment of an ancient 'caveman' family sitting around a camp fire.
A dramatic reconstruction of a Neanderthal family.
BBC Studios.

I recently caught up on iPlayer with the excellent BBC series Human. In it, the paleoanthropologist Ella Al-Shamahi explores 300,000 years of human evolution over five beautifully shot, evocatively presented episodes. I was transfixed by the story of these ancient human societies - of Homo habilis; Homo erectus; the hobbit-like Homo floresiensis - and of the ways that paleoanthropologists and archaeologists study the multiple human species. They walk barefoot in deep pits with what look like tiny paint brushes to dust off their finds. They are endlessly patient, and delighted at tiny scraps that I would overlook as rubbish. They see in these fragments stories of ancient lives that lived, ate, loved and died so long ago. 

Take a set of footsteps fossilised into the ground in White Sands, New Mexico, discernible through their impact and weight distribution. They are thought to be those of a woman walking at speed, probably, scholars think, carrying a child. Now and again these footsteps appear to stop and stand, and in-between the right and the left foot are a small set of footprints. The mother appears to have put down the child for a moment before picking him or her back up and starting again.  

This was so familiar to me, a mother of four. It reminded me of all the times I’d carried toddlers around on my hip before giving up, plonking them on the floor and then switching sides. This very human urge to care for our children, and to get tired by them, echoed through time. Although luckily for me I did not have a giant sloth chasing me, as this ancient mother seems to have done.  

But the flip side of the ability to love is the ability to also reject. And the series highlighted that this less pleasant human habit – the exclusion of others – appears to be an equally core part of our existence.  

Al-Shamahi asks,  

‘what must it have been like to have been a hybrid child... Did these children feel like they belonged or were they teased and ostracised?’   

Behind her question is a sense of deep concern about the hybrid children’s welfare all those millenia ago.  

Fast forward thousands of years. Most of us went to school and know what it feels like to either be different or see someone else who is different. Imagine if a modern-day Homo sapien/neanderthalensis hybrid turned up the local primary school, would it be okay? Unlikely. We don’t look after difference particularly well. The question Al-Shamahi posed seems pertinent today as well as in palaeoanthropology terms, what would it be like to grow up a hybrid? For us today the question is similar, how do we judge what is human? Is our human status founded in the horror and aversion to difference? 

The drive to surround ourselves with similarity and force others to fit is sometimes called ‘the cult of normalcy’. This behaviour only tolerates people who look, act, and represent what is familiar to you. I experience this as a neurodivergent person struggling at times to feel ‘normal’. That is why the story of hybrid children is affectively impactful. Their struggle is easy to imagine, how do they fit in?. What makes them and us human? 

The little story of a mother and a child being carried (minus the sloth part) is enchanting. Is it this love for children that makes the ancient people count as human? Is it the presence of a relationship and the assumed communication between individuals that makes them human?  

The risk here is to say that all people who are in families, who are parents, are the prime example of humanity and that does not fit with many lives that we would want to count as human. Love may be essential, but it cannot be a prescriptive type or circumstance. Nevertheless, the allure of love and community is strong in Human and my response to it. That familiarity with the feeling of exclusion of the hybrid child and the story of the mother and child are common. They are experiences that we can relate to concerning community and care. The series shows these human species in relationship groups, with evidence of successful community and unsuccessful community (again a familiar trait). So far, that ability to love is also the same ability to reject, to cast out the hybrid or the different human. That is unsatisfactory as the trait of what is core to humans despite the likelihood of it being at the heart of the human story.  

What, then of religion? These ancient peoples who lived before language and writing yet still worshipped – their practices evident from paintings found on the walls of caves. Is this what it means to be finally human? Was it, I thought, when they demonstrated language? Was it the early signs of religion and worship? Was it to do with thinking and rationalising, deciding upon a set of gods and the rules about them? However, this cannot be. For there are people today who do not speak through choice or disability. There are those who cannot demonstrate their ability to worship, for the same reasons. Rationalising cannot be the way in which we determine humanity, for then are children, or the intellectually disabled not human? If awareness of the sacred is what makes us human, then that limits those whose cognitive abilities are different. 

Christians believe that what makes us human is the image of God in us. But what is that image? It is given to humans when God made them right at the beginning of things. It is the divine something that sets us apart from trees and plants, even animals. It is a quality that God gives to humans in the creative act of making them. It is not something that humans do for themselves but something they receive from God. Could it be applied to Neanderthals or early human species? I think so. Although these early species were very different in some respects to us, they had the features of humanity that count. They had relationships, the capacity to experience awe and wonder and they loved one another (like the mother and child). The image of God could be many things but one thing is certain, it a gift from God because of his love for humans. The need for love, community and worship that is in all of us points back to this. We love one another because we are first loved by God and that is what makes us human. 

 

 

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